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PURCHASE BY A CORPORATION OF ITS OWN STOCK
By IRVING J. LEVY*
B EFORE considering the decisions of the courts or the rules of
the legislatures, it may not be amiss to look at the business
situations which motivate the purchase by a corporation of its
own shares of stock. It will provide a background which will
help when we come to evaluate the existing law,' and it will follow
the chronological sequence of the real events-the fact situations
before the legal determinations which they call forth.
I
Probably the most frequent use for which corporations pur-
chase their own shares is to effect the compromise of internal
dissension.2 In the small closed corporation, which has so largely
supplanted the copartnership as a business organization, differ-
ences over policy of management are likely to be disastrous. Be-
cause of the lack of a ready market for shares in such companies,
and the inadvisability of dissolution, the retirement of one of the
factions is most easily brought about by a surrender to the cor-
poration of its shares for a consideration, and the vesting of own-
ership of the enterprise in the remaining members. The possible
*Member of the New York Bar.
'On this general subject see: Glenn, Treasury Stock, (1929) 15 Va.
L. Rev. 625; Wormser, The Power of a Corporation to Acquire Its
Own Stock, (1915) 24 Yale L. J. 177; Moore, Purchases By Corpor-
ations of Their Own Capital Stock, (1883) 8 So. L. Rev. 369; notes,
(1928) 41 Harv. L. Rev. 657; (1929) 29 Col. L. Rev. 356; (1929) 15
Corn. L. Q. 108. For a consideration of the English statutes and
cases, see Levy, Purchase by an English Company of Its Own Shares,
(1930) 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 45.
2Copper Belle Mining Co. v. Costello, (1908) 11 Ariz. 334, 95
Pac. 94; Lindsay v. Arlington Co-op. Ass'n, (1904) 186 Mass. 371.
71 N. E. 779: Cole v. Cole Realty Co., (1912) 169 Mich. 347, 135
N. W. 329; Gilchrist v. Highfield, (1909) 140 Wis. 476, 123 N. W. 102.
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effect on creditors may not be considered by the parties because
the smoothing of the ruffled internal affairs occupies their entire
attention, and the business is either in a healthy state or it is
thought will become so when the undesirable members cease to
be troublesome factors. Payment for the shares may be in availa-
able or borrowed cash,8 or in secured 4 or unsecured notes.5 In
rare instances part of the non-liquidated assets of the company
are assigned to the retiring shareholder.6 In all these cases, the
situation may involve a unanimity among all shareholders or else
the purchase may be effected over the opposition of dissenters,
objecting either to the terms of the purchase or to the purchase
generally.7 In the case of a large corporation whose shares are
traded on prominent exchanges, dissatisfied members may in
most instances sell their shares during a favorable market to other
persons, and the practice we are considering will not have to be
resorted to for this purpose very often.
Another use to which the purchase has of late been put is
in making provision for the holding of stock as an incident of
employment." The industrial utility of employee-shareholders has
been profusely and favorably commented upon,) and the neces-
sary stock is procured by the corporation from willing sellers
through purchase. The transfer to the employees is then usually
"First Nat'l Bank v. Salem, etc., (C.C. Or. 1889) 39 Fed. 89.4Berger v. U. S. Steel Corp., (1909) 83 N. J. Eq. 809, 53 Atl. 68.5Hamor v. Taylor-Rice Engineering Co., (C.C. Del. 1897) 84
Fed. 392.
OLowe v. Pioneer Threshing Co., (C.C. Minn. 1895) 70 Fed. 646.7The directors or officers of the company may usually make the
purchase. Phillips v. Riser, (1911) 8 Ga. App. 634, 70 S. E. 79; State
Bank v. Fox, (C.C. N.Y. 1856) 3 Blatch. 431, Fed. Cas. No. 2,683;
Calteaux v. Mueller, (1899) 102 Wis. 525, 78 N. W. 1082.
In some states the approval of the shareholders is necessary. S. D.
Rev. Code sec. 8777. If the purchase is made out of capital, the
unanimous consent of the stockholders must be obtained in North
Dakota and in Oklahoma. N. D. Comp. L. sec. 4531; Okla. Comp.
Stat. sec. 5320.8Iowa Lumber Co. v. Foster (1878) 49 Ia. 25, 31 Am. Rep. 140;
Fremont Carriage Mfg. Co. v. Thomsen, (1902) 65 Neb. 370, 91 N. W.
25; Lawson v. Household Finance Corp., (Del. Ch. 1929) 147 Ati.
312. See the note to Halsey v. Bgomer, (1926) 236 Mich. 328, 310
N. W. 209 in 48 A. L. R. 622.
OR. F. Foerster & Else Dictu, Employee Stock Ownership in the
United States. Organized labor, however, is opposed to this method
of "democratizing industry," regarding it as a back-handed method of
weakening the collective bargaining power of unions. Amer. Fed. of
Labor, Reports of the Executive Council at the 45th Ann. Cony. (1925)
21, 22.
For a discussion of this problem from a legal angle, see Fordham.
Some Legal Aspects of Employee Stock Purchase Plans, (1930) 8
N. C. L. Rev. 161.
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made with an option in the company to repurchase them upon the
termination of employment, because the employee is desired as
a shareholder only while he is an employee,'0 and the shares will
be wanted for the person who is to supplant the employee when
he retires.
Another purpose for which it is desired that a company be
able to purchase its own shares is to permit it, in floating stock
issues, to entice otherwise reluctant buyers by contracts to repur-
chase from them if they desire to back out." To give a prospective
subscriber the right to return the shares to the corporation before
a certain time limit without loss, and thus give him a chance to re-
consider his entry on the venture, is a potent sales feature, anal-
ogous to the "money refunded if not satisfied" and the "thirty days
free trial" terms which attend the sale of other chattels. These
sales may be made with varying degrees of publicity. All the stock
may be offered on these same terms or only some of it, 2 and
without knowledge by all of the existence of this option to resell.'
3
Bankers may take a large block with this string attached; an
unsuspecting public may take the rest, with no conditions at all,
on the strength of the bankers' subscriptions. The knowledge
of creditors of these reservations to the subscriptions may or
may not exist, but it will be a very significant factor.
Corporations may take some of their outstanding stock back
into the treasury to compromise a claim against or a debt owed
by a shareholder.'4 In judging this practice, it will be important
10Topken, Loring & Schwartz Inc. v. Schwartz, (1928) 249 N. Y.
206, 163 N. E. 735; Joseph v. Raff, (1903) 82 App. Div. 47, 81 N. Y. S.
546, affd. 176 N. Y. 611, 68 N. E. 1118; Lawson v. Household Finance
Corp. (Del. Ch. 1929) 147 Atl. 312.
"Vent v. Duluth Copper & Spice Co., (1896) 64 Minn. 307, 67
N. W. 70; Schulte v. Boulevard Gardens Land Co., (1913) 164 Cal. 464,
129 Pac. 582; Barret v. King, (1902) 181 Mass. 476, 63 N. E. 934;
Weiland v. Hogan, (1913) 177 Mich. 626, 143 N. W. 599.
12Stockholders need not all be given the same right. Wisconsin
Lumber Co. v. Green, etc., Tel. Co., (1904) 127 Ia. 350, 101 N. W. 742.
13Melvin v. Lamar Insurance Co., (1875) 80 Ill. 446, 22 Am. Rep.
199; Burke v. Smith, (1872) 16 Wall. (U.S.) 390, 21 L. Ed., 361.
"Conditional subscriptions to the stock of corporations are unusual
and often operate to defeat subscribers who become such absolutely
and upon the faith that all the stock is equally bound to contribute
to the hazards of the enterprise. It misleads creditors and is a fruitful
source of litigation and disaster. Tending to the ensnarement of
creditors and contrary to a sound public policy, conditional subscrip-
tions to corporate shares ought not to be encouraged." Paducah & M.
Ry. Co. v. Parks, (1888) 86 Tenn. 554, 560, 8 S. W. 842, 844. See
White Mts. R. R. v. Eastman, (1856) 34 N. H. 124; 37 Yale L. J.
226.
14Coppin v. Greenless Co., (1882) 38 Oh. St. 275; Draper v. Black-
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to discover whether or not the debt was otherwise uncollectible. 5
Whether or not the shares were fully paid will likewise be a sig-
nificant consideration.
Treasury stock 18 may be acquired through the necessary power
in a corporation to forfeit outstanding shares for non-payment
of calls or assessments." In the absence of other buyers, the cbr-
poration may have to bid in the shares itself, to hold at least
until purchasers can be found. The voluntary surrender of stock
by shareholders in cases where otherwise forfeiture would be
resorted to presents the same basic situation.' 8
Through a gift or bequest a corporation may become the
owner of its own shares."' And by operation of law, treasury
stock may. come into existence. Thus a corporation may be sued
for the conversion of a certificate of stock and judgment may be
rendered against the defendant. If the corporation satisfies the
judgmient by payment, the title to the shares will vest in it, and
the shares will assume the status of treasury stock.'0
well, (1903) 138 Ala. 182, 35 So. 110; Morgan v. Lewis, (1888) 46
Oh. St. 1, 17 N. E. 558.
Similarly a corporation may have accepted its stock as collateral
for a debt and by enforcing its lien treasury stock may have been
created. City Bank v. Bruce, (1858) 17 N. Y. 507.
"5Fitzpatrick v. McGregor, (1909) 133 Ga. 332, 68 S. E. 859;
State Bank v. Fox, (C.C.N.Y. 1856) 3 Blatch. 431, Fed. Cas. No. 2,
683; Morgan v. Lewis, (1888) 46 Oh. St. 1, 17 N. E. 558.1 6The term "'treasury stock" is loosely used to mean all stock
which the corporation holds. Accurately used, it describes only such
of the company's shares which have been issued and outstanding, and
then donated to or purchased by or in some other -way reacquired by
the corporation. Treasury stock is supposed to be held for retirement
or reissue. See Conyngton, Corporate Organization and Management
96 et seq.; Montgomery, Auditing 133; 5 Fletcher, Corporations 5601.
In respect to mining stock, treasury shares have been held to
mean "such stock as is set aside for the actual development of the
property." State v. Manhattan Verde Co., (1910) 32 Nev. 474, 109
Pac. 442.
17 Mitchell v. Blue Star Mining Co., (1917) 98 Wash. 191, 167 Pac.
130; Ailing v. Wenzel, (1890) 133 Ill. 264, 24 N. E. 551.
181n re Denver Hotel Co., [1893] 1 Ch. 495, 62 L. 3. Ch. 450;
Ailing v. Wenzel, (1890) 133 Ill. 264, 24 N. E. 551.
"'Lake Superior Iron Co. v. Drexel, (1882) 90 N. Y. 87; Sherman
v. Shaughnessy, (1910) 148 Mo. App. 679, 129 S. W. 245; Eggmann
v. Blanke, (1890) 40 Mo. App. 318.
2'Condouris v. Imperial Turkish Tobacco Co., (1893) 3 Misc.
Rep. 66, 22 N. Y. 695. In some states the capital of a corporation
may be formally reduced by purchasing shares on the market. N. J.
Conip. Stat. sec. 29, amended by New Jersey Laws 1926, ch. 318, sec.
8; Fla. Comp. Gen. Laws sec. 6548; Del. Gen. Corp. Act. sec. 28.
During the interval from the time of purchase until they are retired, the
shares are like treasury stock.
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Thus far we have mentioned those purposes for corporations
resorting to a purchase of their shares which might be called bona
fide. Whether or not we should conclude that they were in the
final analysis justifiable socially or legally, at least much might
be said in favor of permitting corporations to exercise the power,
within certain limits, to attain these ends. But the practice is
not confined to these situations. The device is useful and in-
dulged for more questionable purposes.
Treasury stock has been the time-honored device for market-
ing "low-grade" securities. 21 Though it has ever been the law
that original stock may not generally be issued for less than par,'2
no such restriction attends the sale of "fully paid" stock which
has returned to the company's treasury ;23 for the interests of
creditors and stockholders are presumed to be protected if the
stated price is paid for the stock originally. No reliance is sup-
posed to be placed on the amount a company realizes on those
shares which subsequently return to it, and consequently such
stock may be sold for less than its par value ;24 so that corpora-
tion directors very often, upon acquiring property from among
their own kin upon organization, or in payment for "services ren-
dered" by irresponsible lawyer's clerks, issue stock to an amount
in accordance with the high valuation placed upon the property or
the services. Part of the stock is thereafter donated to the com-
pany and becomes "non-assessable, full paid, treasury stock." The
price at which it can then be sold to the public becomes a matter
21Dewing, Financial Policy of Corporations 434; See Lake Superior
Iron Co. v. Drexel, (1882) 90 N. Y. 87.
-- in re Alamada & Terito Co., (1888) L. R. 38 Ch. Div. 415;
Donald v. American Smelting & Refining Co., (1900) 62 N. 3. Eq. 729,
48 Atl. 771; New Haven Trust Co. v. Gaffney, (1901) 73 Conn. 480,
47 Atl. 760; Scovill v. Thayer, (1881) 105 U. S. 143, 26 L. Ed. 968;
ef. Handley v. Stutz, (1891) 139 U. S. 417, 11 Sup. Ct. 530, 35 L. Ed.
227.
For examples of statutory provisions to the same effect see, N. 3.
Gen. Corp. Act. sec. 30, as amended by New Jersey, Laws 1904, p. 275;
N. Y. Penal Law sec. 664.23Enright v. Hecksher, (C.C.A. 2nd cir. 1917) 240 Fed. 863; In-
surance Press v. Montauk Wire Co., (1905) 103 App. Div. 472, 93 N.
Y. S. 134.2 Borg v. Int'l Silver Co., (C.C.A. 2nd cir. 1925) 11 F. (2d) 143;
City Bank v. Bruce, (1858) 17 N. Y. 507.
In case such treasury stock were originally issued for property
at an overvaluation, an innocent purchaser for value could not be
held liable by creditors, though a purchaser with knowledge of the over-
valuation might be. Enright v. Hecksher, (C.C.A. 2nd cir. 1925) 240
Fed. 863; Ailing v. Wenzel, (1890) 133 Ill. 264, 24 N. E. 551; Coleman
v. Howe, (1895) 154 Ill. 458, 39 N. E. 725; Berry v. Rood, (1901) 168
Mo. 316, 67 S. W. 644.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
for the "honest discretion" of the directors. 25  Thus a share with
$100 emblazoned on its face may be disposed of to a gullible
public for considerably less because it is treasury stock. Whether
or not creditors today rely on the nominal capital of a company,
or investors on the dollar sign on the shares, the device has some
interesting potentialities-not least among which is its usefulness
as the source of a bonus to be offered with other stock.
Another valuable, albeit questionable, use for treasury stock
is to perpetuate the control of the enterprise without the expensive
requisite of the ownership of a majority of the voting stock.
Treasury stock, it is universally held by the cases 26 and the stat-
utes, 27 cannot be voted. By using the corporate funds to pur-
chase some of the outstanding stock and retire it from the voting
arena, what was before a minority in the controlling group can
be converted into a majority, and their control may thereby be
continued indefinitely. Whether or not a majority can be acquired
in this way very often, their relative voting strength, at any rate,
can be increased. A more roundabout method of accomplish-
ing this same result is to make such purchase through a subsidiary
organized for this purpose.28  The subsidiary directors would vote
the parent stock. The parent directors would vote the subsidiary
stock and make their nominees the subsidiary directors. The
control of the parent company would remain in the existing board
of directors.
25Mosher v. Sinnot, (1905) 20 Colo. App. 454, 79 Pac. 742; Borg
v. Int'l Silver Co., (C.C.A. 2nd cir. 1925) 11 F. (2d) 143; Lake Superior
Iron Co. v. Drexel, (1882) 90 N. Y. 87.
261 Cook, Stock and Stockholders, 3d ed., 421; American Rail-
way Frog Co. v. Haven, (1869) 101 Mass. 398; Ex Parte Holmes,
(1826) 5 Cow. (N.Y.) 426. Nor may the stock be voted if held in the
name of a trustee for the benefit of the corporation. Ex Parte Holmes,
(1826) 5 Cow. (N.Y.) 426; or if it is held by the corporation as pledgee.
Brester v. Hartley, (1869) 37 Cal. 15.27Delaware, Gen. Corp. Act. sec. 19; West Virginia, Code, sec.
53; Maryland Code (Bagby) sec. 22; Tennessee, Gen. Corp. Act. 1929
sec. 12-9.
2sThis seems to have been permitted in New York. In re Buffalo,
etc., R. Co., (1896) 37 N. Y. S. 1048; Lazenby v. Int'l Cotton Mills
Corp., (1916) 174 App. Div. 906, 160 N. Y. S. 1, modifying referee's
report. However, most courts would probably go behind the corporate
entity and prevent the use of a subsidiary to evade the rule that
corporations may not vote their own stock. O'Connor v. Int'l Silver
Co., (1904) 68 N. J. Eq. 67, 59 Atl. 321. This practice would likewise
-be disallowed in those states where the statutes stipulate that treasury
stock may not be voted "'directly or indirectly." Tennessee Gen.
Corp. Act, 1929 sec. 12-9. See the address of Wm. H. Clark on Certain
Aspects and Legal Problems of the Holding Company, (1930) 82 N. Y.
L. J. 96.
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Purchasing its own shares permits of a corporation giving
preferences to favored shareholders-permitting them to with-
draw their contribution to a venture in which they have lost
confidence,29 or to withdraw at an advantageous price,3 0 or when
no other customers are available for their shares. In the case
of banks and similar institutions where by statute an additional
liability over and above the paid-in capital is imposed on mem-
bers, the purchase allows the favored member to escape unscathed
and leaves the remaining shareholders with the entire burden of
satisfying creditors.31
To avoid the preemptive right of shareholders, treasury stock
is useful. Since the beginning of the last century it has been the
law that new issues of stock must be offered to existing share-
holders, pari passu, before the outside public is given a chance
to subscribe. 32 The purpose was to protect their ratable control
of the enterprise and their rights in undivided surplus. But it
is generally held that shareholders have no right of preemption
20Crandall v. Lincoln, (1884) 52 Conn. 73, 52 Am. Rep. 560.
"The enforcement of the contract of purchase would result in
securing to the shareholders whose stock the corporation purchased
a higher price for their shares than could be realized by the remain-
ing stockholders from the assets of the concern . . . and thus the
capital of the concern might be diverted from its legitimate channels
and be used for the benefit of recalcitrant or cantankerous members
to the detriment of confiding shareholders." McSherry, J. in Maryland
Trust Co. v. Mechanics Bank, (1906) 102 Md. 608, 629, 63 AtI. 70.
a
0Grasselli Chemical Co. v. Aetna Explosives Co., (D.C.N.Y.
1918) 258 Fed. 66, 68.
3 1
"For a bank to use its funds in the purchase of stock . . .
might also impair or even destroy all security given by law to
creditors of the bank. The law provides in effect that not only the
bank with all its property shall be liable for its debts, but also that
each stockholder in the bank to the amount of his stock, shall also
be held liable. But if a bank may purchase in all its stocks, and own it
itself, then where would be the security to the creditors .... ?
Savings Bank v. Wulfekuhler, (1877) 19 Kan. 60, 65. See also
Barton v. Port Jackson, etc., Co., (1854) 17 Barb. (N.Y.) 397. 407;
In re Republic Insurance Co., (D. C. Ill. 873) 3 Biss. 452, Fed. Cas.
No. 11,704.3 2 Gray v. Portland Bank, (1807) 3 Mass. 364, 3 Am. Dec. 156;
Stokes v. Continental Trust Co., (1906) 186 N. Y. 285, 78 N. E. 1090;
Frey, Shareholders' Pre-Emptive Rights, (1929) 38 Yale L. J. 563;
Morawetz, Pre-Emptive Rights of Shareholders, (1928) 42. Harv. L.
Rev. 186.
According to' some courts this right of preemption does not apply
to authorized but unissued shares: Archer v. Hesse, (1914) 164 App.
Div. 493, 150 N. Y. S. 296. Cf. Dunlay, v. Avenue M. Garage and
Repair Co., (1930) 253 N. Y. 274, 170 N. E. 917, nor in respect to stock
which has been issued for prop erty. Meredith v. New Jersey Zinc &
Iron Co., (1897) 55 N. J. Eq. 211, 37 Atl. 539; cf. Wall v. Utah Copper
Co., (1905) 70 N. J. Eq. 17, 62 At. 533; Berle, Materials in the Law of
Corporation Finance, 417.
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in treasury stock,3 because upon its reissue their original ratable
control is not altered; so that by purchasing stock and .then
reissuing it to sympathetic parties, the management can avoid the
sometimes annoying right of preemption.
The purchase of its own shares has lately been used for pur-
poses of stock manipulation, and the practice has been prevalent
enough to call forth a warning from the Governors of the New
York Stock Exchange.34  By creating a "bull" market through
extensive purchases of its own stock, a corporation sets an arti-
ficial value on its shares. Purchases made at a price above the
intrinsic value of the shares would impair the finances of the
company and reduce the intrinsic value of the remaining shares.33
Purchases made at a figure less than the book value though pos-
sibly a source of profit, would be mere speculation and an unau-
thorized corporate activity;36 economically unproductive and
basically more vicious than speculation in the securities of other
companies.37 Here again we have the possibility of bringing about
33Borg v. Int'l Silver Co., (C.C.A. 2nd cir. 1925) 11 F. (2d) 143;
State v. Smith, (1876) 48 Vt. 266; Crosby v. Stratton, (1902) 17 Colo.
App. 212, 68 Pac. 130; Hartridge v. Rockwell, (1828) R. M. Charlt.
(Ga.) 260. But see Dunn v. Acme Auto Garage Co., (1918) 168 Wis.
128, 169 N. W. 297; Frey, Shareholders' Pre-Emptive Rights, (1929)
38 Yale L. J. 563, 580. For a criticism of the Borg Case on this point
and of the rule that shareholders have no right to subscribe to
treasury stock, see 36 Yale L. J. 1181.
34See the New York Times, January 10, 1930. Re London H. & C.
Exch. Bank, (1870) L. R. 5 Ch. App. 444; Maryland Trust Co. v.
National Mechanics Bank, (1906) 107 Md. 608, 624, 63 Ati. 70. For the
possibilities of the practice in this respect, see Green's Brice, Ultra
Vires, Green's ed., 95."35This is illustrated by the balance sheet of the General Food
Corporation for December 31, 1929. On the assets side appears an
item, "Investment in company's own stock $4,144,518." A reserve is
set up "for fluctuation in marketable securities $430,000." The com-
pany purchased in the market break of the fall of 1929 60,000 shares
of its common stock. At the beginning of 1930 and for several months
thereafter the shares were selling around 60. This makes the market
value of the treasury stock about $3,600,000 and explains the reserve
set up, since the stock purchased is apparently carried at cost which
was greater than the present market value. In the annual statement,
the company gives this purchase of its stock as the reason for the de-
cline in the ratio of quick assets to liabilities from what it was the
previous year.
3GSee the opinion of Lord Macnaghten in Trevor v. Whitworth,
(1887) L. R. 12 A. C. 409.
Even though the purchase was for speculation, it has been held
that an injunction would not issue in favor of one who has acquiesced
in the practice. Coleman v. Columbia Oil Co., (1856) 51 Pa. St. 74.37Profits realized from such activity might be confused by in-
vestors with income derived from the corporation's usual activities.
This was one of the reasons which caused the officials of the New
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the same situations through trading in shares of the parent by
subsidiary companies.
The people most likely to be affected adversely by the practice
are the creditors of the corporation. Whether out of capital or
surplus, the purchase of a single share involves the diminution
of the corporation assets, and a corresponding impairment of the
creditor's security. A purchase may render the corporation in-
solvent or intensify existing insolvency. From a creditor's point
of view, treasury stock is in no sense an asset out of which
to realize payment of his claims3 -- at best it is a potentiality for
the realization of assets when and if resold. Most of the argu-
ments advanced against the practice of corporations purchasing
their own shares have been made with the dangers to creditors
in view. The familiar "trust fund" doctrine 39 against the return
of any capital to shareholders grew up to prevent similar practices.
To this end, also, the statutory methods40 for the reduction
of capital stock generally require that the rights of creditors be
safeguarded. Thus the extent of the reduction is usually limited
so that it will "not reduce the fair value of the assets of the cor-
poration to an amount less than the total amount of its debts
and liabilities plus the amount of its capital stock as so reduced."'
The consent of the secretary of state is generally required to see
that the law has been followed. Public advertisement is some-
York Stock Exchange to frown on the practice. N. Y. Times, Tanu-
ary 10, 1930. Another objection is that such a decrease in the out-
standing capital stock reduces the base on which the company can
issue debentures in the future.
According to newspaper information, the practice we are discus-
sing is supposed to have been indulged in extensively during the fall
of 1929 by many of the newly formed -investment trusts."
a3bIn re Tichenor-Grand Co., (D.C.N.Y. 1913) 203 Fed. 720;
Stevens v. Olus Mfg. Co., (1911) 72 Misc. Rep. 508, 130 N. Y. S. 22;
affd. 146 App. Div. 951, 131 N. Y. S. 1145.3 9The doctrine was first enunciated by Judge Story in Wood v.
Dummer, (C.C. Me. 1824) 3 Mason 308, Fed. Cas. No. 17, 944. See
Pierce v. United States, (1920) 255 U. S. 398, 402, 41 Sup. Ct. 365, 65
L. Ed. 697. Cf. Lebens v. Nelson, (1921) 148 Minn. 240, 181 N. W.
350. For a discussion of the "trust fund" doctrine, its various rami-
fications and for a collection of the authorities pro and con, see 5
Thompson. Corporations 252 et seq.40It is generally held that there is no inherent or implied power
in a corporation to reduce its capital stock. There must be statutory
authorization. Seignouret v. Home Ins. Co., (C.C. La. 1885) 24 Fed.
332; Tschumi v. Hills, (1897) 6 Kan. App. 549, 51 Pac. 619.
-"For illustrations of the usual statutory provisions governing
the reduction of capital stock, see: New Hampshire, Pub. Laws 1926,
886: Ohio. Gen. Code 1929 sec. 8623-39; Pennsylvania, Stat. (West)
1920 secs. 5696-99; Virginia, Code 1924 sec. 3781; Rhode Island, Gen.
Laws 1923 sec. 3518; Uniform Business Corporation Act sec. 41-2.
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times prescribed. And in some states in order to protect share-
holders, the existing division of control is sought to be preserved
by requiring a ratable reduction among all members.4 2
But by purchasing shares from individual shareholders, a
factual reduction in the capital can be effected without resort to
the elaborate method the statutes prescribe, and for purposes
which perhaps the statute would proscribe.4 3  The capital fund
might thereby be impaired; the reduction would in almost every
case be of necessity non-ratable; 4 1 creditors would, at least for
a time, be unaware of the change in capitalization. And whether
or not the shares were actually retired at a later time, the capital
would be reduced for all practical purposes-for there would be
no assurance that the shares would be resold, either because the
directors made no effort or because no customers could be pro-
cured at a satisfactory price.
4 5
The mere possibility of abuse is not of itself an argument
against permitting a practice which may be useful. But in the
realm of corporation finance and management, the readiness with
which a power may be and is being abused may be a valid rea-
son for its abolition, especially when, as we shall later see, the
valid functions it serves may be performed by less volatile
agencies. It is not suggested that there is no power in a court
of equity to restrain abuses of the practice.46 No doubt discern-
ing courts should and will prevent the purchase of a company's
own shares when done fraudulently or when it conflicts sharply
with well recognized and superior legal interests. But there is
an entire lack of agreement as to what is an abuse of the power,
and in some jurisdictions equitable relief can be expected only
against its grosser and more flagrant manifestations.4 7  To be
42General Investment Co. v. Amer. Hide & Leather Co., (1925)
98 N. J. Eq. 326, 129 Atl. 244; Currier v. Lebanon Slate Co., (1875)
56 N. H. 262; Theis v. Durr, (1905) 125 Wis. 651, 104 N. W. 985;
Berger v. U. S. Steel Co., (1909) 63 N. J. Eq. 506, 53 Atl. 14. Cf.
British & Amer Trustee, etc., Corp. v. Couper, [1894] A. C. 399.
43Trevor v. Whitworth, (1887) L. R. 12 A. C. 409.
4"But see -Currier v. Lebannon Slate Co., (1875) 56 N. H. 262,
Berger v. U. S. Steel Co., (1909) 63 N. J. Eq. 506, 53 Atl. 14; and note
126 infra.
45I Machem, Corporations, sec. 514 et seq.; 1 Morawetz, Private
Corporations, 2d ed. sec. 112-113.
46In re Tichenor-Grand Co., (D.C.N.Y. 1913) 203 Fed. 720; Luther
v. Luther Co., (1903) 118 Wis. 112, 94 N. W. 69; Essex v. Essex, (1905)
141 Mich. 200, 104 N. W. 622.47For the sharp split of authority on the merits of the practice
and the limitations to be imposed thereon, see, Cook, Corporations,
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forced to seek recourse to an equity action to restrain the abuse
of a power, conceded to exist, is at best a doubtful and inade-
quate remedy, and in the case of a small shareholder, the costs
and difficulties of prosecuting make it prohibitive.
II
With this sketch of the uses to which the power to purchase
its shares is or may be put before us, it is now proposed to exam-
ine the cases and statutes.
We find very little case or statute law on corporate problems
in this country before the beginning of the last century.48  Pri-
vate corporations were not unknown in the colonies, 49 but they
were few in number.50 Cases involving corporations appear in the
courts slowly in the early 19th century, and when they do arise
they involve for the most part banks and insurance companies
with only a sprinkling of industrial corporations.5 The industrial
corporation begins to assume a prominent position in the second
half of the century with the rapid expansion of industry gen-
erally, and thereafter its growth is phenomenal. General incor-
poration laws, tax exemptions in various forms, and special
privileges from states vying with one another to attract industries
to settle within their borders fostered .corporate development.52
In the early stages of our law, American judges and lawyers
got their notions about corporations from English cases and
sec. 312 et seq., Morawetz, Private Corporations, 2d ed., sec. 112-13;
Machen, Corporations, sec. 514 et seq., sec. 626.4sWilliston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before
1800, (1888) 2 Harv. L. Rev. 65, 105.
49The common law prohibition of corporations except by royal
charter was the law in the American colonies as well as in England.
1 Machem, Corporations 2.
501 Davis, Early History of American Corporations 91; Hender-
son, The Position of Foregn Corporations in American Constitutional
Law, pp. 12 ff.;
Chancellor Bland of Maryland stated that the only corporations
which existed in that province were what we now call public corpora-
tions. (1829) 3 Bland's Ch. Dec. (Md.) 416-420. The monopolistic
feature characterized early American corporations as it did their Eng-
lish prototypes. Henderson, The Position of Foreign Corporations in
American Constitutional Law 16.521 n Volume I of the U. S. reports covering the years 1790-1806
three per-cent of the total of cases reported involve private corpora-
tions; in Vol. 6 (1824-1826) 11 per-cent; in Vol. 102 (1880) 36 per-
cent; in Vol. 246 (1917), 57 per-cent. See Carter, The Corporation
as a Legal Entity, 26.52What was probably the first general law for the formation of
business corporations in this country was passed in New York in 1811,
New York, Laws 1811, ch. 67. Other early general incorporation
laws are, Ohio Laws 1811, ch. 15; Pennsylvania, Laws 1835-1836, ch.
194; North Carolina, Laws, 1836-37, chs. 10-12, 1837, p. 214.
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treatises." But the law in England in the early part of the last
century relating to business corporations was not very helpful,5 4
especially for the solution of the problems presented by the
dynamic organization which the corporation of this country was
becoming. On the problem of the purchase by a corporation of
its own shares, the English cases were confused and confusing55
until near the close of the century, and were further complicated
by a failure to differentiate clearly between principles applicable
to joint-stock companies without limited liability of members, and
corporations proper.9 0  So when our problem comes before the
courts for the first time, there is little, if any reliance on English
precedent and the judges and lawyers are forced to unravel it on
considerations of policy and logic. It is not surprising, therefore,
that from an early date there has been a lack of unanimity on
the power to make such purchases.
The first case in this country seems to have been one in 1828, 57
in which a Georgia court held that a bank could invest idle capital
in the purchase of its own stock which it could thereafter sell.
That creditors might be concerned with the transaction was per-
ceived, but the substitution of the stock for the money in the
treasury was thought to be without prejudice to them.5" The
court likewise appreciated that such practices might be indulged
in by the directors to maintain control, but thought it could not
properly inquire into motive. Thus, in the first case, we have the
problem squarely raised, its major implications considered.59 and
decided in a way destined to become, with certain refinements,
the prevailing American view.10
53Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations before
1800, (1888) 2 Harv. L. Rev. 165.54Not until 1844 was there a general corporation law in England
which tended to encourage the use of the corporate form. 7 & 8 Vict.
ch. 110, and not until The Companies Act of 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. ch.
89) was passed, did English company law enter its modern phase.55Hope v. Int'l Finance Soc. Ltd., (1877) L. R. 4 ch. Div. 327,
46 L. J. Ch. 200; In re Dronfield Silkstone Coal Co. Ltd., (1881) L. R.
17 Ch. Div. 76, 50 L. J. Ch. 387.5GSee Levy, Purchase by an English Company of its Own Shares,(1930) 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 45.57Hartridge v. Rockwell, (1828) R. M. Charlt. (Ga.) 260.58However, the Georgia legislature soon after disagreed and
passed a statute making the purchase of stock a misdemeanor and
subjecting president and directors to fine and imprisonment for its
violation. Georgia, Penal Code 1850, ch. 9, 6th Div. sec. 43.
"
9The court also decided that shareholders had no right of pre-
emption in the treasury stock when the directors saw fit to reissue it.G°In Georgia, it has since been disapproved of. Fitzpatrick v.
McGregor, (1909) 133 Ga. 332, 65 S. E. 859. That case also criticized
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This case, strangely enough, though a square holding for the
power, has not been relied on to any great extent by the later
courts which also validated such purchases. Dicta of other cases
are quoted and relied on, or else the precedents cited are of deci-
sions which dealt with the acceptance by corporations of their
stock in settlement of debts owing to them."' These latter cases
and sweeping generalizations therein were regimented in subse-
quent cases in support of purchases made not merely to com-
promise antecedent debts but for other purposes, to show that
the majority view in this country authorized a corporation to buy
its own shares generally; -' and by this-not unusual-develop-
ment that rule did grow up by accretion to become the prevail-
ing view.
The cases under the majority rule permitting the power in
corporations fall into several classes, so far as the reasons given
for the result. First, there are the courts which find no express
prohibition against the practice in the statutes or charter, and
seeing nothing inherently vicious in such l)urchases, decide that
Robison v. Ieall. (1858) 26 Ga. 17 where the power was found to
exist in the provision of the charter permitting the company "to have,
purchase . . . land, rents .... goods, chattels and effects of what kind,
nature or quality, whatsoever."
6IThus City Bank v. Bruce, (1858) 17 N. Y. 507, 508, which seems
to be the basis for the New York rule permitting purchases, was the
case of a corporation accepting its shares for an antecedent debt.
But the language in the case was strong for granting the power
generally. The authority given by the court for that generalization
and for its own decision was Taylor v. Miami Exporting Co., (1833)
6 Ohio 83, which was likewise a case of accepting stock for a debt.
Commissioners of Johnson County v. Thayer, (1896) 94 U. S. 631, 24
L. Ed. 133, cited the City, Bank Case for the broad proposition that a
corporation may purchase its own shares, though no antecedent debt
was involved and the statement was entirely unnecessary for its
decision. Thus fortified by strong language from the highest courts,
the later cases indulge in sweeping remarks, so that by 1905 in Burnes
v. Burnes, (C.C.A. 8th cir. 1905) 137 Fed. 781, on the basis of the
above cases, the court states as settled law that, "in the absence of
constitutional or statutory prohibition, corporations have inherent
power to buy, to sell and to retire their own stock." See note 2 MIN NESOTA
LAW REvIEw 459.
6"See the able dissent of Timlin, J. in Gilchrist v. Highfield,(1909) 140 Wis. 476, 123 N. V. 102 in which he traces the similar
development of the rule in that state by this process. For by 1910
in Wisconsin it is stated that "by a long line of decisions here . .. a
corporation ...may, in general, so long as it acts in good faith ...
purchase its own stock . . ." Atlanta, etc., Ass'n v. Smith, (1909) 141
Wis. 377, 381, 123 N. V. 106, per Marshall J.
Judge Timlin analyzes the cases referred to and shows they are
authority for no such generalization, referring either to the exceptional
facts involved or to the fact that the statements relied upon were
entirely dicta.
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the power exists.6 3 Then there are others which, though they
fail to find an express grant of power to purchase its own shares,
think the power is incidental and necessary to accomplish the
main objects for which the corporation was formed. 4 Another
line of cases finds direct authorization in the usual power given
corporations in the statutes or charters to purchase, sell and hold
property, both real and personal. 5 It had long since been de-
cided that shares of stock, including its own, were personalty,66
and the definition was felt to have compelling force.67
The power is circumscribed, the courts admit, by the usual
safeguards against fraud and breach of the fiduciary relation of
the directors and majority shareholders, and in this way other
parties are thought to be protected. 8 In the cases where treasury
stock is created through the settlement of an antecedent debt or by
forfeiture, the necessity to save loss is the ground on which the
power is predicated.'
Fairly contemporaneously with the development of the major-
ity view permitting a corporation to purchase its own stock, a
contrary rule took root prohibiting such practices. Here, too, the
reasons given for the result vary. There are those courts which
regard a corporation as a legal personality of limited powers,
63Atlanta, etc., Ass'n v. Smith, (1909) 141 Wis. 377, 123 N. WV.
106; Dupee v. Boston Water Power Co., (1873) 114 Mass. 37; Hart-
ridge v. Rockwell, (1828) R. M. Charlt. (Ga.) 260.64Thus in Dupee v. Boston Water Power Co., (1873) 114 Mass.
37, it was held that a corporation chartered with the power to pur-
chase and operate water power plants could, when its water power
privileges were no longer profitable, lawfully sell its sites and receive its
own stock in payment. See also. Williams v. The Savage Mfg. Co.,(1851) 3 Md. Ch. Dec. 418; New England Trust Co. v. Abbott, (1894)
162 Mass. 148, 38 N. E. 432.
"
5This power will be found in the articles of almost every corpora-
tion, whatever its nature. It is inserted to provide for the holding of
the incidental property which every company must own. Thus, the
United Corporation of Delaware, an investment company, has the power
to hold and deal in all kinds of real and personal property in all parts
of the world, though its main function is to hold the stock of utility
corporations.66Bligh v. Brent, (1837) 2 Y. & C. Ex. 268.67Farmers & Mechanics Bk. v. Champlain Trans. Co., (1846) 18
Vt. 131; Berger v. U. S. Steel Corp., (1902) 63 N. J. Eq. 809, 53 Atl. 68.6 Luther v. Luther Co., (1903) 118 Wis. 112, 94 N. W. 69;
Elliot v. Baker,, (1907) 194 Mass. 518, 80 N. E. 450; In re Fechheimer-
Fischel Co., (C.C.A. 2nd cir. 1914) 212 Fed. 357; Olmstead v. Vance
& Jones Co., (1902) 196 Ill. 236, 63 N. E. 634; Borg v. Int'l Silver Co.,(C.C.A. 2nd cir. 1925) 11 F. (2d) 143.69Ex Parte Holmes, (1826) 5 Cow. (N.Y.) 426; Draper v. Black-
well, (1903) 138 Ala. 182, 35 So. 110; Mitchell v. Blue Star Mining
Co., (1917) 98 Wash. 191, 167 Pac. 130. See 7 R. C. L. 552.
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operating under a state grant, capable of performing only such
acts as are expressly authorized by the state.7 ° Failing to find
any definite grant of power to buy its own stock, either in the
statutes or charter, the purchase is held to be invalid.71 Or else
it is decided that the enumeration of the powers which corpora-
tions may exercise implies the exclusion of all others, and the
purchase is accordingly disallowed."2 Others find the purchase an
impairment of the security of creditors, and the "trust fund"
doctrine is thought to compel the denial of any such power.73 Some
jursidictions, probing into intra-corporate relations see an injury
to the small nonassenting shareholders through a readjustment
of voting strength. 74 The possibilities of abuse, and the realiza-
tion that the device is a way of evading the statutory method for
a reduction in capital motivate other courts,75 and a vigorous
minority rule developed which follows, with some qualifications,
the English law.
But, as in England,70 exceptions are recognized to be necessary.
Thus, even in such jurisdictions, a corporation may take its own
stock as security for an antecedent debt ;77 or in compromise of
a disputed claim or a hopeless debt ;78 or in case of the insolvency
of its debtor ;79 or by way of gift or devise.80  And the minority
70Strauss v. Insurance Co., (1855) 5 Oh. St. 59; Cartwright v.
Dickinson, (1889) 88 Tenn. 476, 12 S. W. 1030.7
'Coppin v. Greenless & Ramsom Co., (1882) 38 Oh. St. 275, 43 Am.
Rep. 425; Hunter v. GaTanflo, (1912) 246 Mo. 131, 151 S. W. 741;
Savings Bank v. Wulfekuhler, (1877) 19 Kan. 60; Barton v. Port
Jackson, etc., ;Co., (1854) 17 Barb. (N.Y.) 397. Exceptions are rec-
cognized, however, e.g. taking stock for antecedent debts.
72State v. A. & N. R. R., (1888) 24 Neb. 144, 38 N. W. 43.
73This is the most usual reason given for prohibiting the pur-
chase. Whaley v. King, (1918) 141 Tenn. 1, 206 S. W. 31; Crandall
v. Lincoln, (1884) 52 Conn. 73, 52 Am. Rep. 560; Kom v. Cody Detec-
tive Agency, (1913) 76 Wash. 541, 136 Pac. 1155.74This possibility was perceived in Hartridge v. Rockwell, (1828)
R. M. Charlt. (Ga.) 260, but the court thought it could not properly
inquire into the motive behind the purchase. Strangely enough, the
later cases seldom considered the problem. Some few did, however,
Thomas v. Int'l Silver Co., (1907) 72 N. J. Eq. 224, 73 Ati. 833; Borg
v. Int'l Silver Co., (C.C.A. 2nd cir. 1925) 11 F. (2d) 143. But these
cases are concerned with settling a limitation on a power conceded to
exist. Cf. Percy v. Millandon, (1832) 3 La. 570, 587.75Morgan v. Lewis, (188) 46 Oh. St. 1, 17 N. E. 558; Burke v.
Smith, (1929) 111 Md. 624, 74 Atl. 114.76Hokinson v. Mortimer, Harley & Co., [1917] 1 Ch. 646, 86
L. J. Ch. 467; In re Denver Hotel Co., [18931 1 Ch. 495, 62 L. J. Ch.
450; Kirby v. Wilkins, [1929] 2 Ch. Div. 444, 142 L. T. 16.
77Draper v. Blackwell, (1903) 138 Ala. 182, 35 So. 110.
78State v. Oberlin Bldg. Ass'n. (1879) 35 Oh. St. 258.
79Bank v. Overman Carr Co., (1899) 17 Ohio C. C. 353.
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jurisdictions generally think an exception to the prohibition should
be made to permit a company to accept the shares issued to a
purchaser with an option to return them if he so elects.8 ' Some-
times this situation is attempted to be distinguished from a pur-
chase by the corporation by calling it the failure of a conditional
sale, or its rescission. In any case it is generally permitted. -2
The statutes on the subject have not been very helpful because
they are for the most part sketchy and show the same lack of
agreement among the states as previously characterized the judi-
cial rules. In a majority, the purchase of shares is permitted
generally; but usually with some limitations, as, "if the capital
is not impaired thereby,"" or "out of surplus" '8 4 or "out of surplus
profits."8 5  In some it is allowed in effecting the forfeiture of
stock86 or for satisfying antecedent debts,8 7 and by implication
cannot be made for other purposes. Inclusio unius, exclusio
alterius. As has been indicated, in some states it is thought that
the power in a corporation to purchase and hold personal property
is statutory authorization for the purchase of its shares.88 A few
8 0Rivanna Navigation Co. v. Dawsons, (1846) 3 Gratt. (Va.)
19, 46 Am. Dec. 183.8
'Schulte v. Boulevard, etc., Land Co., (1913) 164 Cal. 464, 129
Pac. 582.8
"Mulford v. Torrey Exploration Co., (1909) 45 Colo. 81, 100 Pac.
596. But see 5 Fletcher, Corporations 965 to the effect that under
the minority rule even such contracts would not be permitted.8
"Indiana Gen. Corp. Act. sec. 3; Colo. Comp. Laws sec. 2260;
Delaware, Gen. Corp. Law sec. 19; Missouri, Rev. Stats. sec. 10151,
as amended by Missouri Laws 1927, p. 394; Nevada, Gen. Corp. Law
sec. 9-3.84Florida, Comp. Gen. Laws sec. 6534; Louisiana Laws 1928 Act.
250, sec. 23; Tennessee, Laws 1929, p. 235, sec. 12-9; South Dakota,.
Rev. Code sec. 8777 provides that a purchase may be made out of sur-
plus funds but the consent of the shareholders is necessary.8 North Dakota, Comp. Gen. Laws sec. 4531. But its articles may
provide otherwise. Likewise if there is unanimous consent of all
stockholders, purchases out of capital are permitted. Oklahoma has
similar provisions. Oklahoma, Comp. Stat. sec. 5320. Since these limi-
tations are imposed presumably for the benefit of creditors, it is hard
to see why unanimous consent of the shareholders should dispense
with their operation.86Idaho, Comp. Stat. sec. 4745; Maine, Rev. Stat. ch. 51, sec. 40;
Mass. Gen. Laws 1821, ch. 156, sec. 20, but by judicial decision in that
state a corporation has been held to have the power to purchase its
shares for "any legitimate purpose." Brown v. Little, (Mass. 1929)
168 N. E. 525; California Civil Code, sec. 343, 344; Philippine Islands,
Corp. Act. secs. 44, 45.87Connecticut Gen. Stat. sec. 3429; Vermont, Gen. Laws sec.
4920; Virginia, Code sec. 3807.
88E. g. New Jersey, see supra note 65; Robison v. Beall. (1858)
26 Ga. 17, 28. But see note 60
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states, which have in recent years adopted new corporation acts,
have elaborate provisions enumerating the situations in which
such purchases may be made and the limitations thereon., Only
in a very few jurisdictions are there direct statutory prohibitions
against the creation of treasury stock through purchase.9 0 In
quite a number of states there are no statutes dealing with the
problem.91
89Sec. 8623-41 of the Ohio Code, as amended in 1929 permits the
purchase of shares of any class:
(a) When the articles authorize their redemption.
(b) To collect or compromise a debt, claim or controversy in
good faith.
(c) In any case where the purchase is made out of "the surplus
of the aggregate of its assets over the aggregate of its liabilities plus
stated capital" by a Y vote of shares or as the articles provide, "but
no such purchase shall be made so as to favor any shareholder over
any other."
(d) For resale or allotment to employees, or in contracts by the
company to repurchiase shares from employees.
(e) To eliminate fractional shares.
(f) "For the purpose of resale to shareholders or otherwise when
the articles in substance provide that the corporation shall have a
right to preemption if and when any shareholder desires, or on, the
happening of any event, is required to sell his shares or any part
thereof."
(g) From dissenting shareholders entitled to be bought out.
The Louisiana statute is very similar. In addition it stipulates
that treasury stock may be sold by directors at a price they may fix
"not to be less than the price at which the same were purchased."
Louisiana, Laws 1928, act. 250, sec. 23.0oWyoming, Comp. Stat. sec. 5056; Kentucky, Stat. (Carrol) sec.
554; but the taking of stock to prevent a loss on a debt previously
contracted is permitted. The stock so acquired must be disposed of
within a year.
National banks are expressly prohibited from purchasing or hold-
ing their own shares except where necessary to save loss on debts
previously contracted in good faith. Shares so acquired must be sold,
at a public sale if necessary, within six months else the bank may
be dissolved. 12 U. S. C. A. sec. 83, 1 Mason's Code, tit. 12, sec. 83.
In Germany a corporation may not purchase its own shares, except
in furtherance of plans for amortizing shares as provided by the
articles. Commerce Code, Art. 226. Where such purchases are effected
the reduction must apply to all shares, pari passu. Exch. Cas. Reps.
25, 258. The new 1929 English Companies Act has a provision which
by implication forbids the purchase. 19 & 20 Geo. V. ch. 23, sec. 45.01Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi. Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin.
In New York from an early day it has been held that a corporation
has by implication the power to buy its own shares. See City Bank v.
Bruce, (1858) 17 N. Y. 507. Although the doctrine arose through
an extension of the holding in that case, which decided only that a
corporation could accept its stock in settlement of an antecedent debt,
it has been repeatedly affirmed that the power exists generally. Moses
v. Soule, (1909) 63 Misc. Rep. 203, 118 N. Y. S. 410, affd. 136 App.
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III
In It re Tichenor-Grand Co., 92 Judge Learned Hand made the
following observations:
"If a corporation has received property into its treasury of
the value of its authorized shares, that is no doubt subject to the
vicissitudes of the enterprise, which will be represented by public
knowledge of its success or of the value of its shares. If, how-
ever, it purchases its own shares this affects neither the value93
of the other shares, the success of its enterprises, nor the amount
of its apparent share capital. It is merely a method of secret
distribution, against the deceit of which its creditors have abso-
lutely no means of protection. The fund which they have the
right to rely upon has been surreptitiously taken from them ...
It is a strange thing, I think, that there have been cases which
Div. 904, 120 N. Y. S. 1136; Burnes v. Burnes, (C.C.Mo. 1904) 132 Fed.
485 cert. denied 199 U. S. 605, 26 Sup. Ct. 746. Cf. Bartlett v. Drew,(1874) 57 N. Y. 587.
However, the Penal Law has limited the power by making it a
misdemeanor for directors to apply any but "surplus funds" to the
purchase. New York, Laws 1909, ch. 88, sec. 664-4.
Prior td New York Laws 1924, ch. 221, the restriction was more
rigid, confining the source of funds to "surplus profits" and thus
presumably excluding purchases from a surplus arising out of appre-
ciation or the modern device of "paid-in surplus."
Today in New York a promise by a corporation to purchase its
own shares is illusory, because there is no certainty that surplus funds
will exist when the date for performance arrives. The promise is not
good consideration because the act promised may be a crime and it
does not create a valid contract. Topken, Loring & Schwartz, Inc. v.
Schwartz, (1928) 249 N. Y. 206, 163 N. E. 735.
And where a corporation agrees to purchase its own stock and
gives a note in payment, the purchase is invalid and the note uncol-
lectible, though the corporation be solvent, if at the time for payment
of the note, it has no surplus. In re Fechheimer-Fischel Co., (C.C.A.
2nd cir. 1914) 212 Fed. 357. Cf. Cross v. Beguelin, (1929) 252 N. Y.
262, 169 N. E. 378. See (1930) 15 Corn. L. Q. 108.
92(D.C.N.Y. 1913) 203 Fed. 720.
931n view of what followed, Judge Hand probably did not mean
that the market or book value of the stock might not be adversely
affected. He seems rather to mean that this is no transaction which
could produce anything of value, as would, say the contribution of the
corporation's funds to a purchase of bonds or shares of another com-
pany. In the latter case the corporation would be lending capital to
prosecute the business of the other company, and the interest would be
the return. But,; the use of the company's own funds to purchase its
own shares does not produce anything of economic value, even if the
shares are later sold at a profit. This is probably the force behind the
United States Treasury ruling that neither taxable profit nor de-
ductible loss can arise from transactions by a corporation in its own
stock. Treas. Dept. Reg. 74, art. 66. This, however, does not intend
to deny that a commercial profit or loss can be realized through such
transactions. See (1930) 2 Corp. Practice Rev. 7 for a discussion of the
taxation aspect of such purchases.
PURCHASE BY CORPORATION OF ITS OWN STOCK 19
permit the practice, which seems to me to be inevitably mis-
chievous commercially."
In 1828, Judge William Davies of the superior court of
Georgia, delivering his first opinion on the bench and deciding the
first case involving the purchase by a corporation of its own
stock,9 4 made these comments:
"If from the course of the business, or the state of things,
the capital of the bank cannot be usefully employed in loans,
there can, I think, be no objection against the purchase of its
own stock. In such purchases.a part of the capital stock is with-
drawn, but it is represented by the stock purchased. . . ." It
becomes a "part of the capital stock . .. to which the creditors
of the bank must look for payment of their claims."
Judge Hand decided that a corporation could not make such
purchases of its own stock if no surplus existed ;95 Judge Davies
held that such purchases were legitimate corporate activities even
though the capital of the company was used. Both appreciated the
risks to which creditors were exposed. And in all the cases, it is
the apparent conflict between the exercise of this power and the
rights of creditors which chiefly concerns the court.
One of the deep-seated principles of our law is the so-called
"trust fund" doctrine enunciated by Judge Story in 1824.91 What-
ever criticism has since been levelled against the use of that phrase
to explain the legal limitations on the use of the capital"7 of a
corporation, the principle remains that it may not be returned to
subscribers or shareholders so as to injure creditors.98  It may
0'Hartridge v. Rockwell, (1828) R. M. Charlt. (Ga.) 260, 261.95In the Tichenor-Grand Case, there was a sale of stock to the
plaintiff who became an employee, with an option in the vendee to
leave at the end of three years and sell the stock back to the company
at par. His claim after the bankruptcy of the corporation was dis-
allowed by Judge Hand.
90Wood v. Dummer, (C.C. Me. 1824) 3 Mason, 308; Sawyer v. Hoag,
(1873) 17 Wall. (U.S.) 610, 21 L. Ed. 731.
OTHollins v. Brierfield Coal & Iron Co., (1893) 150 U. S. 371,
14 Sup. Ct. 127, 37 L. Ed. 1113; Ames v. Heslet, (1897) 19 Mont. 188,
47 Pac. 805; I-ospeg v. Northwestern Mfg. & Car Co., (1892) 48 Minn.
174, 50 N. W. 1117.
OSHospes v. Northwestern Mfg. & Car Co., (1892) 48 Minn. 174,
50 N. W. 1117; Patterson v. Lynde, (1883) 106 U. S. 519, 1 Sup. Ct.
432, 27 L. Ed. 265; Hatch v. Dana, (1879) 101 U. S. 205, 25 L. Ed. 885;
Miller v. Griswold Bldg. Co., (1921) 217 Mich. 192, 185 N. W. 677;
Pierce v. United States, (1920) 255 U. S. 398, 41 Sup. Ct. 365, 65 L. Ed.
697; Commercial Bank v. Burch, (1892) 141 Ill. 519, 31 N. E. 420.
The same principle is sire to the restrictions against the withdrawal
of capital in the form of dividends. Detroit Trust Co. v. Goodrich,(1913) 175 Mich. 168, 141 N. W. 887; Coleman v. Booth, (1916) 268
Mo. 64, 186 S. W. 1021; Hubbard v. Weare, (1890) 79 Ia. 678, 44 N. W.
915; Bank of Morgan v. Reid, (1921) 27 Ga. App. 123, 107 S. E. 555.
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be that today people, dealing with and extending credit to corpora-
tions, do not rely principally on the stated capital of the organi-
zation,9 9 but rather on its current ratio and its prospects of future
Generally there are statutory provisions relating to the sources
out of which dividends may be paid. The usual restrictions are that
no dividends may be paid if the company would be renderd insolvent;
or if the capital would be impaired, but only if made out of profits, or
surplus, or surplus profits, or if the remaining assets will be greater
than a certain sum. See, e.g., North Carolina, Cons. Stat. Ann. 1919
sec. 1179; Pennsylvania, Laws 1919 p. 914, sec. 8; Missouri, Laws 1921
p. 662; New York Stock Corp. Law sec. 58. The interpretation of
these statutes has been a troublesome problem engaging the attention
of courts, lawyers and accountants. See Weiner, Theory of Anglo-
American Dividend Law, (1929) 29 Col. L. Rev. 461; Reiter, Dividends,
Profits and the Law; Palmer,. Company Law, 12th ed., 226 et seq.;
Sparger, Surplus and the Payment of Dividends, (1930) 8 N. C. L. Rev.
14; Levy, Purchase by an English Company of Its Own Shares,
(1930) 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 45, 63.
It should be observed that the problem is basically the same as
that of applying the statutes which similarly restrict the funds which
a company may use to buy its own shares. And the same considera-
tions should govern the non-statutory restrictions imposed on both
transactions. For if the return of capital in the form of dividends is
prohibited, certainly the return of a shareholder's entire contribution
to the venture should not be allowed even though his shares are re-
ceived in return. This limitation on the power to purchase is imposed
even in the absence of statute. Hamor v. Taylor-Rice Eng. Co., (C.C.
Del. 1897) 84 Fed. 392; Tiger v. Rogers Cotton Cleaner Co., (1910) 96
Ark. 1, 130 S. W. 585; Buck v. Ross, (1896) 68 Conn. 29, 35 Atl. 763;
In re S. P. Smith Lumber Co., (D.C. Tex. 1904) 132 Fed. 618.
The problem is further complicated by the advent of the extensive
use of non-par stock; Weiner, The Amount Available for Dividends
Where No-Par Shares Have Been Issued, (1929) 29 Col. L. Rev.
906, and of the use of the device of paid-in surplus. For a discussion
of the problems raised in this latter institution see: Berle,
Materials in the Law of Corporation Finance 475; Mitchell,
11 A. B. A. Jour. 377; Merchants and Insurers' Reporting
Co. v. Shroeder, (1919) 39 Colo. App. 226, 178 Pac. 540;
Equitable Life Assurance Soc. v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., (1914) 212
N. Y. 360, 106 N. E. 92. The payment of dividends out of paid-in
surplus seems to be permitted. Western & Southern Fire Ins. Co. v.
Murphey, (1916) 56 Okla. 702, 156 Pac. 885; Smith v. Cotting, (1918)
231 Mass. 42, 120 N. E. 177. Delaware, Gen. Corp. Law sees. 14, 19, 34.
To authorize a purchase of shares out of paid-in surplus is almost
as objectionable as though it were made out of capital; for both funds
represent the contributions of the subscribers to the venture, and to
permit the withdrawal of either injures creditors and remaining share-
holders both. See Corliss v. United States, (C.C.A. 8th cir. 1925)
7 F. (2d) 455, 456; Pierce v. United States, (1920) 255 U. S. 398, 41,
Sup. Ct. 365, 65 L. Ed. 697.09But see the able opinion of Judge Mitchell in Hospes v. North-
western Mfg. & Car Co., (1892) 48 Minn. 174, 50 N. W. 1117, which.
though -critical of the use of the phrase "trust fund" to describe the
legal limitations on the use of capital, points out how on the whole
the same results are reached on the theory of fraud or holding-out.
Creditors are presumed to deal and extend credit in reliance on the
representation made by corporations through their stated capitalization
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earnings. But the protection afforded by the law which attempts
to keep the capital fund intact against dissipation is not incon-
siderable. The ultimate test comes when there is insolvency.
10 0
In such situations the property and assets which represent the
capital contribution of the shareholders are the sources from
which will be realized whatever the creditors will get. The cur-
rent ratio, the prospects of earnings, if relied upon, have proved
delusive. But the purchase of some ot its shares by the corpora-
tion will have depleted this capital fund by a return to some
shareholders of that which would have been available for creditors
when their day of reckoning came, in the same way as an outright
gift to shareholders of some capital or a cancellation of unpaid
subscriptions would deplete that fund.' 01 The latter are dearly
prohibited, 102 yet they are no more objectionable so far as credi-
tors are concerned than the former practice. It is true that the
capital stock purchased is returned to the treasury, as the Georgia
court pointed out, :0 3 and may be looked to by "creditors . . . for
payment of their claims." But it is hardly necessary to point out
the utter worthlessness to creditors of the shares of an insolvent
corporation.
10 4
And so it is -that generally, either by statute or judicial rule,
the power is limited to purchases which are "out of surplus,"' 0'
-and, if not as represented, creditors are defrauded. Ballantine, Cor-
porations 673 et seq.100Glenn, Treasury Stock, (1929) 15 Va. L. Rev. 625.
01"If a corporation be incompetent to release subscribers to its
capital stock whose subscriptions have not been paid, it is equally
without authority to expend the fund represented by the capital stock
to purchase shares held by a stockholder who has paid for them."
McSherry, C. 3. in Maryland Trust Co. v. Nat'l Mechanics Bank,
(1906) 102 Md. 608, 626, 63 AtI. 70. See the opinion of Lord Herschell
in Trevor v. Whitworth, (1887) 12 A. C. 409.
The objection to such purchases is that "they necessarily result
in keeping up the appearance of a capital which has actually been
depleted." Learned Hand, J. in Re Tichenor-Grand Co., (D.C.N.Y.
1913) 203 Fed. 720, 721.
'
02Sawyer v. Hoag, (1873) 17 Wall. (U.S.) 610, 21 L. Ed. 731;
Lebens v. Nelson, (1921) 148 Minn. 240, 181 N. W. 350; Vermont
Marble Co. v. Declez Granite Co., (1902) 135 Cal. 579, 67 Pac. 1057.
Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Burch, (1891) 141 Ill. 519, 31 N. E. 689;
Potts v. Wallace, (1892) 146 U. S. 689, 13 Sup. Ct. 196, 36 L. Ed. 1135.
103Hartridge v. Rockwell, (1828) R. M. Charlt. (Ga.) 260.
104n re Tichenor-Grand Co., (D.C.N.Y. 1913) 203 Fed. 720; Borg
v. Int'l Silver Co., (C.C.A. 2nd cir. 1925) Savings Bank v. Wulfekuhler,
(1877) 19 Kan. 60; Crandall v. Lincoln, (1884) 52 Conn. 73, 52 Am.
Rep. 560. Glenn, Treasury Stock, (1929) 15 Va. L. Rev. 625.
105For illustrations of the statutes, see supra note 84; Grasselli
Chemical Co. v. Aetna Explosives Co., (D.C.N.Y. 1918) 258 Fed. 66;
Western & Southern Fire Insurance Co. v. Murphy, (1916) 56 Okla. 702,
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or "which do not impair the capital,"'10 or which do not reduce
the assets of the corporation "to an amount less than its debts and
liabilities."'01 7  But in some states it seems to be enough if the
purchase does not bring about outright insolvency, 0 8 and for such
purposes the capital stock of the corporation is not reckoned as a
liability.10 9 In others, the only expressed limitafion on the power
is that it be not exercised "to defraud creditors." 1 0  The well-
known difficulty of proving fraud-" will suggest itself to indicate
how entirely inadequate is this protection afforded to creditors.
The supposed inviolability of the capital fund in our jurisprudence
will show the anachronism of the powek to make the purchase
out of capital.
IV
The principal objection to the practice under consideration is
not its effect on creditors-the legislatures and courts have per-
ceived the dangers in this direction and to an extent provided
tberefor-but its effect on the intra-corporate relation among
shareholders. Strangely enough, this possibility of abuse by a
management of the power to create treasury stock has seldom
been perceived either in this country or in England where the
power is firmly denied. And yet it is this aspect of the device
which seems especially vicious.
Whatever injustice there may be in the "divorce of suffrage
and control from ownership" in modern corporations, which en-
gaged the ire of Professor Ripley,"1 2 at least in situations where a
person buys stock which he knows to be without voting power
he has exercised his choice with the facts before him. That is
to say, if a person buys shares in a company in which he knows
the control is centered in a small block of stock owned by a clique
of which he is no part, he buys into such a situation with his eyes
open. Whether or not the law should, in spite of this, impose
156 Pac. 885; ("surplus profits" held to mean surplus of any kind.)
106Supra note 83. Hamor v. Taylor'Rice Engineering Co., (C.C.
Del. 1897) 84 Fed. 392.
10Ohio Gen. Code sec. 8623-8; Marvin v. Anderson, (1901) 111
Wis. 387, 87 N. W. 226.
'
08Cf. Dalton Grocery Co. v. Blanton, (1911) 8 Ga. App. 807, 70
S. E. 183; Turner v. Goetz, (1924) 184 Wis. 508, 199 N. W. 155.
'
0ORasmussen v. Roberge, et al., (1927) 194 Wis. 362, 216 N. V.
481.
110 Fremont Carriage Mfg. Co. v. Thomsen, (1902) 65 Neb. 370,
91 N. W. 376.
"'Berle, Studies in the Law of Corporation Finance 163; Ballan-
tine, Corporations 144 et seq.
11Main Street and Wall Street.
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the exacting duties of a trustee on the owners of the management
stock"' is a nice question of ethics on which there is a very
respectable difference of opinion. 114 But suppose he buys into a
situation in which he knows that $100,000 has been dedicated to
the enterprise; that he is to have three-tenths of the voting power
because he has contributed $30,000 to the venture for which he
has received three-tenths of the total stock, all of which has
voting rights. He assumes that control of the policies of the
corporation will be in the owners of shares representing at least
$50,000 of invested capital. Should we permit a group represent-
ing $40,000 of invested capital, but temporarily in control of the
directorate, to use the company to create $21,000 of non-voting
treasury stock, convert their minority interest into a majority
power, and thereby perpetuate their control?'" If creditors were
not permitted to object, either because the surplus funds were
used or no insolvency resulted, the transaction would seem to be
unimpeachable under the rule in many jurisdictions. It may
well be that a discerning court would set such a move aside," 6
113Berle, Materials in the Law of Corporation Finance. Cf. Bar-
clay v. Wabash Railway Co., (1930) 280 U. S. 197, 50 Sup. Ct. 106.
14Berle, Materials in the Law of Corporation Finance 475. Com-
pare the reviews of Professor Berle's work in (1929) 38 Yale L. J.
1004 by R. T. Swaine, in (1929) 42 Harv. L. Rev. 714 by J. V. Kline
and in (1929) 7 N. Y. U. L. Q. R. 553 by the writer. See the dissenting
opinion of Learned Hand, J. in Barclay v. Wabash Railway Co., (C.C.A.
2nd cir. 1929) 30 F. (2d) 260.
11Even the requisite majority of shareholders cannot amend the
articles of incorporation to strip a block of stock of voting power. Lord
v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., (1909) 194 N. Y. 212, 87 N. E. 443.
"... the scheme of corporate management is that of a representa-
tive government, in which the representatives are bound to be governed
by and represent only the interests of those they. represent. Hence any
device or practice which in any wise or to any degree diminishes or
prevents the exercise of the right of each of the active owners to have
a voice in the election of directors precisely in the proportion to the
amount of his interest is vicious and in positive contravention of the
fundamental principle upon which our corporations are built up."
Pitney V. C., in O'Connor v. Int'l Silver Co., (1904) 68 N. J. Eq. 67,
68, 59 Atl. 321.
"16A critical court would probably prevent such a purchase when
it was a deliberate move to gain control in the face of a pending contest
between factions.
Elliot v. Baker, (1907) 194 Mass. 518, 80 N. E. 450; Luther v.
Luther Co., (1903) 118 Wi3. 112, 94 N. W. 69; O'Connor v. Int'l Silver
Co., (1904) 68 N. J. Eq. 67, 59 At1. 321.
However, these were strong cases and the courts indicate that they
will probably intervene only when no other end but the gain of control
motivates the purchase, and the voting power is being rearranged with
a contest in view. Short of such flagrant abuse of the practice by the
directors for which there is equitable relief, there still remain possibili-
ties for considerable redistribution of control. Every such rearrange-
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but if the "legal" method were followed, it would be a difficult
job to show fraud or overreaching, especially if the court were
disinclined, as was the Georgia court, to examine into motive.117
The shareholder in our suppositious case can hardly be said
to have bought into such a situation. True it is that he could
have foreseen that a majority of the shares might come into the
hands of a single individual or an unsympathetic group. But this
would be through the usual transfer of shares among individuals.
He did not anticipate that the company's funds would be diverted
from their normal ends of prosecuting the business of the enter-
prise to rearrange the control or serve the personal interests of
the management.:" 8
And even if the instances in which a purchase would change
a minority interest into a controlling interest would be rare, the
purchase of a single share rearranges the corporate structure and
changes the proportionate control of every member." 9 The status
of our shareholder is altered, and factually the venture on which
he originally agreed to embark is not the same.120
ment runs counter to the shareholders' factual anticipation when they
subscribed. And to obtain the intervention of the court it is necessary to
show that the conduct complained of is outside the pale of "honest discre-
tion" and that the directors are within the realm of fraud. There is no
such requirement where the breach of a statutory prohibition is the
gravamen. And though here too a lawsuit would be necessary, the out-
come is much more certain, and directors would be more reluctant to
risk the violation of a statute when the consequences are definitely
known and the likelihood of action on the part of some dissenting
shareholders is greater.
117 Hartridge v. Rockwell, (1828) R.M. Charlt. (Ga.) 260.
118Grasselli Chemical Co. v. Aetna Explosives Co., (D.C.N.Y.
1918) 258 Fed. 66, 68.
19It may be that today when so much stock offered to the pub-
lic has no voting power and the interest of the small shareholder in
exercising his vote when he has one seems slight, this question loses
much of its practical importance. However, when a real contest for
control arises within the managing group, votes become vastly impor-
tant even if all classes of stock do not have them. Witness the rise
in the Value of the shares of the Standard Oil Co. of Indiana during
the fight in 1929 by John D. Rockefeller, Jr., to oust Col. Stewart
from control.
And in the small corporation, the proportionate voting strength
will ever be a vital feature of the ownership of its stock.
Where cumulative voting is provided for by reducing the number
of voting shares through a purchase by the company, the minority
shareholder may raise his proportionate interest sufficiently to enable
him to elect himself to the board of directors. See Drinker, The Pre-
emptive Right of Shareholders to Subscribe to New Shares. (1930)
43 Harv. L. Rev. 586, 603.
120"The purchase by a corporation of its own stock not only
changes the fractional interest of the dissenting shareholders against
his will but it changes the character of his property in which he has
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In another significant sense the acquisition of treasury stock
changes the enterprise. The contributed capital is intended for
carrying on the business of the company. The amount of capitali-
zation may be important in inducing people to invest in the
venture. A man may be quite willing to invest $5,000 in a corpora-
tion which is to start in the business of manufacturing with
$1,000,000 original capital, and yet be quite unwilling to risk
his money in a company which will have only half that sum to
go along in a highly competitive field. When a company purchases
its shares out of capital, it retires from its treasury a sum which
was originally contributed for the prosecution of its business and
may leave available for that purpose a smaller sum than that on
which some shareholders might have originally insisted before
entering the company. 1
21
For the majority rule, it may be argued that by this "reduc-
tion" of outstanding stock the remaining shareholders stand a
chance of getting an increased dividend, as treasury stock is not
counted as outstanding stock entitled to share in profits. The
answer is that their share of possible losses is also increased.
And further, though certain claims upon future dividends are
extinguished by creating treasury stock through purchases, at the
same time a corresponding quota of working capital is destroyed.
With a decreasing working capital the profits of the business
will most probably be smaller and the pro rata share of the re-
maining shareholders will not be enhanced by the transaction.
In fact, our supposed shareholder will feel that his profits will
be cut down for when he invested his money he thought the exi-
gencies of the venture required the full amount of the original
capitalization. And the management is here altering the original
an interest, deprives him of the chance of dividends, increases against
his will his proportionate liability to clerks and servants and laborers
... and also is effectual in silencing and eliminating a shareholder
(the seller to the corporation) who might rate with dissenting stock-
holders at the next corporate election and against the office-holding
majority." Timlin, J., dissenting in Gilchrist v. Highfield, (1909)
140 Wis. 476, 482, 123 N. W. 102.121This is the force behind the rule that in the absence of legislative
authority the capital stock of a corporation may not be reduced.
Droitwich Patent Salt Co. v. Curzon, (1867) L. R. 3 Exch. 35;
Cartwright v. Dickinson, (1889) 88 Tenn. 476, 12 S. W. 1030; Star
Publishing Co. v. Ball, (1922) 192 Ind.' 158, 134 N. E. 285.
And wherever it has been appreciated that a purchase is, for a
time at least, an indirect reduction of capital-in those jurisdictions
courts have refused to imply any power in corporations to make such
purchases. Trevor v. Whitworth, (1887) 12 A. C. 409; Abeles v. Cochran,
(1879) 22 Kan. 405, 31 Am. Rep. 194; Crandall v. Lincoln, (1884) 52
Conn. 73, 52 Am. Rep. 560.
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corporate structure on which the subscriber might be presumed
to have relied when he entered the venture.
Nor is the situation greatly improved when the purchase is
made out of surplus, so far as objecting shareholders are con-
cerned. Money is invested in shares of stock as in most other
things for the realization of profits in the form of dividends.
A considerable amount of discretion is vested by laws in the
directors in deciding in what instances profits shall be paid out to
the shareholders as dividends. 12 For it may be good business
policy to build up a reserve or surplus account for a variety of
reasons. But it is hardly anticipated by those who buy shares
that profits will be diverted to permit some few members to retire
their capital contribution and share of the surplus from the ven-
ture, thereby postponing the payment of dividends to the others.
If the shares are purchased at a price above the actual value of
the shares, the remaining members' share in the undivided surplus
is impaired, and money is actually being taken from the pockets
of the .remaining members for the benefit of the retiring share-
holders.123 If the purchase is made at a price commensurate with
the actual value of the shares, the surplus which would ordinarily
be devoted to dividends is instead tied up to effect either an in-
direct and unauthorized reduction in capital or else the possibility
of dividends is postponed until such time as the treasury stock
can be and is resold at an adequate price. The price at which it
is then reissued will again affect the share of the undivided
surplus which each member had before, and it is not rash to
suppose that all these transactions can hardly be effected without
that share in the surplus being in some way altered. Lastly, if
the surplus is used to buy shares for a price less than their in-
trinsic value and a profit is realized when they are later reissued
at a higher price, even then the distribution of the surplus as
dividends has been postponed, and the additional profit is realized
from a "trafficking in its own shares." '24 This is no proper
122Raynolds v. Diamond Mills Paper Co., (1905) 65 N. J. Eq.
299, 60 Atl. 941; Continental Insurance Co. v. Reading Co., (1921)
259 U. S. 156, 42 Sup. Ct. 540; 66 L. Ed. 871: Wormser, Compulsory
Declaration of Dividends, (1918) 3 So. L. Q. 281.
123 Such a transaction could probably be enjoined if the overvalua-
tion was flagrant enough to be indicative of fraud. But even within
the limits of honest discretion by the directois, the value of the re-
maining shares might be appreciably affected. See the illustration
from the balance sheet of the General Food Corporation, supra note 35.
"24People who buy such shares on the market relying on the
company's earnings are likely to be misled into believing that the
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"object" of any corporation for the prosecution of which a
charter could be obtained in any state, and it seems hardly a
justification for withholding dividends from investors. And yet,
in every jurisdiction where purchases are permitted at all, these
results may be brought about. The directors, moreover, decide
whose shares are to be bought, and are thus permitted to declare
who is to get his contribution and part of surplus forthwith,1 25
and who must continue with his share of the surplus withheld. 126
V
Let us now consider the practice from a theoretical point of
view. As was pointed out by the House of Lords in the leading
English case of Trevor v. Whitworth,127 a purchase of its own
shiares by a corporation will be either of two things. It will be
in effect a reduction in the capital stock, or else it will be a
"trafficking in shares." That is to say, either the shares will be
purchased for retirement to reduce the capital stock of the cor-
poration or they will be for a time dormant as treasury stock to be
later reissued.
Almost every state has a statute which prescribes a method for
bringing about a reduction of capital stock. 28 Some require that
the elaborate procedure of amending the charter be followed. 29
In many at least the sanction of a stockholders' meeting is neces-
profits were realized from the primary activity of the company and
that they were indicative of a healthy state of affairs.
225Grasselli Chemical Co. v. Aetna Explosives Co., (D.C. N.Y.
1918) 258 Fed. 66. This assumes a case where all the shareholders
were willing to sell their shares at that price. Obviously the com-
pany could not buy all.
12 61n all these cases, it is to be observed, the relative status of
the remaining shareholders in the venture will almost always be dis-
turbed, because the purchases will almost always be non-ratable.
Trhe rule requiring a ratable treatment of shareholders when a reduc-
tion of capital is proposed, General Investment Co. v. American Hide
and Leather Co., (1925) 98 N. J. Eq. 326, 129 AtI. 244, does not
apply to a purchase though the same reasons for a like rule exist.
Shoemaker v. Washburn Lumber Co., (1897) 97 Wis. 585, 73 N. W.
333. In Berger v. U. S. Steel Co., (1902) 63 N. J. Eq. 809, 53 Atl.
68, the court said that companies desiring to purchase their own stock
must offer to buy from all equally. This, however, cannot be the rule
for it would render the device nugatory in all the transactions in
which it is usually used. Thus it would be useless for buying out
a faction for then the offer would have to be extended to all, and if
there was general acceptance the corporation would disappear. At
any rate, the Berger Case is not the law even in New Jersey for the
statutes authorize a non-ratable purchase. New Jersey, Comp. Stat.
sec. 29.
127(1887) 12 A. C. 409.
128See note 41 supra.
'120Massachusetts, Gen. Laws, 1921, ch, 156, sec. 45; New York
Stock Corp. Law secs. 37, 38; Colorado, Comp. Laws, sec. 2276-2283.
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sary.1 30 The filing of a certificate and the approval of some state
official is a usual prerequisite. 131 Sufficient assets must be left
to safeguard creditors. 1 2 In this way the state has sought to pre-
serve the rights of creditors and shareholders 3 3 from a decrease in
the capital of a company. But the same states in many cases
permit the purchase of its shares with no such stringent restric-
tions. ' And yet a reduction in capital may thus be brought about
as effectively as though the statutory mode were followed. 35 For
even though the shares are not retired and are carried on the
books as treasury stock, for all practical 6 purposes the stock is
not outstanding and is as though it had been reduced. 31 Only
'
30Louisiana, Laws 1928 Act 250,, sec. 45; North Dakota, Gen.
Laws, sec. 4557 as amended by Laws 1921, ch. 46.
1''Supra note 41.
'23 Florida, Rev. Gen. Stat. 1920 sec. 4086; Illinois Gen. Corp. Act.
sec. 34.
13It is sometimes provided that dissenting shareholders may
in the event of a reduction of capital have their shares appraised and
paid for by the corporation. Indiana, Ann. Stat., Burns, 1926, sec. 4958.
See the Uniform Bus. Corp. Act. sec. 42-1. These statutes recognize
the injury which a reduction in capital may cause an objecting member.
'34Thus Massachusetts requires that to reduce the capital stock
the articles must be amended-an elaborate proceeding calling for a
stockholders' meeting, the approval of the secretary of state, etc.
Massachusetts Gen. Laws 1921, ch. 156 sec. 46. Yet the directors may
purchase shares of its stock with the company's funds. In the absence
of fraud or insolvency the transaction will be unimpeachable. Elliot
v. Baker, (1907) 194 Mass. 518, 80 N. E. 450. Since nothing prevents
the directors from keeping the stock in the treasury indefinitely, a
reduction of stock can thus be as effectively brought about as though
the statutory mode were followed.
In North Dakota a stockholders' meeting must be called, two-
thirds of the outstanding stock must approve, and a certificate of the
reduction filed with the state. North Dakota, Comp. Law sec. 4557,
as amended by North Dakoia Laws 1921, ch. 46. Yet its statutes
also provide that a corporation may purchase its own shares, and here
again it is not necessary to resort to the statutory method if a reduc-
tion is sought. North Dakota Comp. Laws sec. 4531.
In New York the certificate must be amended, the proposed change
advertised and the state's consent obtained. New York Stock Corp.
Law. secs. 37-38. But treasury stock can be created in much simpler
style-by purchasing shares out of surplus.
Florida and Delaware are more consistent. One of the ways of
reducing capital under their statutes is through the purchase of shares.
Florida Comp. Laws, 1925, sec. 22; Delaware, Gen. Corp. Law sec. 28.
185Morawetz in his well-known treatise says:
"No verbiage can disguise the fact that a purchase by a company
of shares in itself really amounts to a reduction of the company's
assets." Private Corporations, 2nd ed., 113.
Machen regards a purchase by a company of its own stock as
"a subtle method of evading the rule against unauthorized reduction
of capital." Modern Law of Corporations, 514.
13 6It does make a difference for purposes of taxation. See Knicker-
bocker Importation Co. v. State Board of Assessors, (1907) 74 N. J. L.
583, 65 Atl. 913.
'13 Thus it is is not included in computing dividends; West Vir-
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a few states make it mandatory that the shares be resold.'38 In
the others there is no such compulsion. And even in the former,
it is hard to see how the reissue can be compelled-for there is
no assurance that at a future date there will be customers "ready,
able, and willing" to buy at what the directors may deem a fair
price.139
The stAtufes, in laying down in detail the procedure for re-
ducing the capital or for the redemption of preferred stock, cer-
tainly intended that to be the sole method. 4 0 Those provisions of
necessity must be exclusive, else they lose all their force.' 4 ' And
ginia Code, ch. 53, sec. 18; nor for purposes of a quorum, Florida
Comp. Laws 1925, sec. 8; nor can it be voted, Delaware, Gen. Corp.
Law sec. 19; Ex Parte Holmes, (1826) 5 Cow. (N.Y.) 426; it is not
properly speaking an asset of the corporation, Borg v. Int'l Silver
Co., (C.C.A. 2nd cir. 1925) 11 F. (2d) 143; Stevens v. Olus Mfg. Co.,
(1911) 74 Misc. Rep. 508, 130 N. Y. S. 22. Cf. Coit v. Freed, (1897)
15 Utah 426, 49 Pac. 533. It is not in any true sense an outstanding ob-
ligation of the company.. Borg v. Int'l Silver Co., (C. C. A. 2nd cir.
1925) 11 F. (2d) 143. Of course, treasury stock does offer the opportun-
ity to realize assets in the future when the stock is sold.
'
38Kentucky, Stat. (Carrol) sec. 554; Vermont, Gen. Laws sec. 4920.
'39And yet, in Vermont unless treasury stock is disposed of within
five years, the corporation may be dissolved. Vermont, Gen. Laws
sec. 4920. Within that period, the trustees, in whose name the cor-
poration's shares must be held, are to try to dispose of them without
loss, but in "any event" they must sell them before the five years
elapse. This offers some interesting opportunities for chicanery. The
provision seems to be of questionable worth.
140Lord Herschell in Trevor v. Whitworth, (1887) 12 A. C. 409,
said:
the stringent precautions to prevent the reduction of the
capital of a limited company, without due notice and judicial sanction,
would be idle if the company might purchase its own shares wholesale
and so effect the desired result."
In this country no judicial order is necessary to reduce the capi-
tal, but the states have provided administrative substitutes for the
judicial supervision which the English law prescribes.
143And yet, even where a statute forbade the company to "divide,
withdraw, or in any way pay to the stockholders or any of them any
part of the capital ... or reduce its capital stock except as authorized
by law," with a proviso allowing the company to accept its own shares
in settlement of bad or doubtful debts, a federal judge held that the
company, if at the time insolvent, might with the assent of all its
shareholders purchase a majority of its shares, though it involved the
use of its capital. In re Castle Braid Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1906) 145 Fed.
224. In a recent Montana case, a subscriber sued a corporation on
its promise to repurchase its shares. The defense was that it was
financially unable to do so. Specific performance was decreed, because
the court said that even though insolvency existed, there was no show-
ing that any creditor or stockholder would be injured. "Where the
reason for the rule fails the rule fails . . . we see no reason why the
plaintiffs are not entitled to judgment, even if the corporation is in-
solvent." Davies v. Montana Auto Finance Corp., (1930) 86 Mont. 500,
284 Pac. 267. However these cases seem clearly wrong and would
probably not be followed.
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yet, by permitting a purchase at the same time, the states provide
an alternative method which may well prove useful when some
shady practice is contemplated and some part of the statutory
procedure would prove embarrassing; for it is a far cry from the
elaborate procedure of amending the charter or calling a stock-
holders' meeting to a mere resolution of the directors which is
sufficient to bring treasury stock into existence.
But let us assume that the purchase is not to circumvent the
statutes in effecting a reduction of capital, but is made to create
treasury stock which is later to be reissued. And let us assume
that customers can then be secured to bring about a fair resale.
This leaves us with the principle that corporations may "traffic
in their own shares." Now it is clear that no state would permit
a corporation to come into juristic being for the sole purpose of
trading in its own shares. Corporations are allowed only for
socially useful purposes. No economist would contend that such
a company was performing any useful function since its funds
would be used to buy its own shares which are thereafter to be
sold and then bought again. This would be sheer speculation, and
it would not long subsist even for this purpose, for the practice
lacks any foundation to cause a variance in the price. By the
same token, this object, clearly illegal and anti-social if alone,
would seem to be no more valid when combined with corporate
objects which are legitimate. It is as economically unproductive
in combination as it is alone, and has the same speculative elements.
It seems therefore that a purchase of its own shares by a
corporation is unjustifiable theoretically from either view-either
because it is an indirect reduction of capital in evasion of the
statutory method or because it is a "trafficking in its shares."
The English courts have recognized this dilemma and have dis-
allowed the practice. 14 2
It may be urged that no Procrustean bed of logic forces us
to choose between these two theoretical explanations of the prac-
tice. That is, it may be argued that the purchase is no reduction
142From the standpoint of metaphysics, it is difficult to conceive
of a corporation-a legal personality-being a member of itself. This
logical difficulty troubled Lord Watson in Trevor v. Whitworth, (1887)
12 A. C. 409. And if a corporation purchased all of its shares (which
it might theoretically do in some states if it had no debts), we should
have a case of a corporation dissolving itself into nothingness by the
device of swallowing its viscera and leaving, perhaps a surplus of
assets in vacuo without an owner. The practice offers considerable
food for fantastic speculation.
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because there is no permanent retirement of the shares, 143 for the
shares may be reissued and the assets replenished; and also that
it is not necessarily a "trafficking in shares," for such purchases are
indulged in (when made honestly) not for purposes of profit nor
as an object of the venture, but as an ancillary and necessary
measure144 to effect the results we have indicated at the beginning
of this article-to settle intra-corporate dissensions, as the machin-
ery for employee-shareholder plans, etc.
It will therefore be profitable to consider whether this means
is indispensable for attaining these legitimate ends.
To SETTLE INTERNAL DISSENSION
Settling intra-corporate disputes by buying out a vigorously
objecting minority is not always an unmixed blessing. Dissenting
shareholders who make things unpleasant for the group in control
often act as efficient deterrents against dubious practices and they
are not always to be discouraged.
Lord Macnaghten once asked:
"Who are the shareholders whose continuance in a company
the company or its-executives consider undesirable? Why, share-
holders who quarrel with the policy of the board, and wish to
turn the directors out; shareholders who ask questions which it
may not be convenient to answer; shareholders who want infor-
mation which the directors think it prudent to withhold. Can it
be contended that when the policy of directors is assailed, they
may spend the capital of the company in keeping themselves in
power, or in purchasing the retirement of inquisitive and trouble-
some critics?'
4 5
He and the other Law Lords thought not, and disallowed the
purchase.
But suppose it is agreed that it will be better for the company's
well-being to rid itself of undesirable shareholders and that they
are willing to sell their shares. Should the majority be permitted
to use the corporate funds to bring this about? Certainly not if
creditors will thereby be injured. Nor should the maiority be
allowed to do it against any dissent'14-for the non-assenting mem-
143Borg v. International Silver Co., (C.C.A. 2nd cir. 1925) 11 F.
(2d) 143.
'14American Railway Frog Co. v.. Haven, (1869) 101 Mass. 398.
Williams v. The Savage Mfg. Co., (1851) 3 Md. Ch. Dec. 418, 452.
145Trevor v. Whitworth, (1887) 12 A. C. 409.
'14Thus under common law the unanimous consent of the stock-
holders was necessary for the sale of all the assets of a solvent cor-
poration; Abbot v. American Hard Rubber Co., (1861) 33 Barb. (N.Y.)
578; or to effect a consolidation or merger, Geddes v. Anaconda Min-
ing Co., (1920) 254 U. S. 590, 41 Sup. Ct. 209, 65 L. Ed. 425; or to
change the nature of the business, Natusch v. Irving, (1824) 2 Coop.
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ber ought to be able to insist that the enterprise continue with its
capital structure unaltered, except when the articles are amended.
And where there is no dissent by the remaining members the
retirement of the troublesome members can be brought about by
reducing the capital. If the majority are loath to follow the
statutory mode of reduction because it is perhaps too slow or
arduous, it is not unjust to compel them to purchase the shares
as individuals to gain the unopposed control they seek. This
would be requiring an additional contribution to the venture to
keep it as it was when the state first sanctioned it. The history
of corporations in our "liberal incorporation states" should warn
us against providing wide powers for directors to play fast and
loose with. 147
It is to be remembered that the dissension can only be obviated
by a purchase of shares where the dissenters are willing to sell.
If the shares have a ready market they may and should be disposed
of there. Buying out opposition at a premium above the market
price should not be encouraged because of its effect on creditors.
So far as the interests of shareholders who object to the pur-
chase go, it should be prohibited for it will dilute their share
of the assets.148  In a small corporation, therefore, where the
shares have no ready market and the necessity to look elsewhere
for purchasers exists, two available methods of getting rid of
troublesome factions have been suggested. The power in the
corporation to purchase its own shares is not essential.
EMPLOYEE-STOCKHOLDER PLANS
Though it is supposed to be industrially desirable 149 that em-
ployees have a proprietary interest in the business for which they
are working, 50 this argument would have to yield when it con-
temp. Cott. 358; or in the financial structure, Kent v. Quicksilver Min-
ing Co., (1879) 78 X. Y. 159.
147See Ripley, Main Street and Wall Street.
148Similarly in cases where shareholders are not consulted and
they are at least "non-assenting." This will be the usual situation
for the directors themselves can usually make the purchase.
Such a purchase might be enjoined by a shareholder if the dis-
parity between the value of the shares and what was paid was con-
siderable. DuPont v. DuPont. (D.C. Del 1917) 242 Fed. 98.
149But see 33 Am. Federationist 1191; note 9 supra.
15°It is here suggested that if under these schemes the employee
is given the same class of shares which the general public generally
gets for its money, the proprietary interest and control which he
acquires is negligible. Stripped of voting power his position ap-
proaches the status of a creditor.
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flicted with more fundamental interests.' 5' Thus it could not be
permitted to reduce the company to insolvency, 152 or to deplete the
capital of the company."' In other cases, the needed shares for
incoming employees can be procured from authorized but unissued
stock, or by increasing the capital stock." 4 If the policy of the
company is to have the employee cease to be a shareholder when
his employment ceases, the sale to him of the stock can be with
an option in the remaining shareholders or in some of them to
repurchase.' These latter can then resell those same shares to
the new employees who will replace the old. This option would
not create an illegal restraint on alienation and is generally en-
forceable.""
"'Thus in Illinois and New York where stock may be issued to
employees without regard for the preemptive rights of shareholders,
dissenting shareholders are given the right to have their shares ap-
praised and paid for. Illinois Laws 1923, p. 282; New York Stock
Corp. Law sec. 14. Contracts made under such plans are unenforce-
able if they conflict with the rights of creditors. Pender v. Speight,(1912) 159 N. C. 612, 75 S. E. 851; Porter v. Plymouth Gold Mining
Co., (1904) 29 Mont. 347, 74 Pac. 938. Likewise if they interfere with
fundamental rights of shareholders. Boley v. Development Co., (1907)
126 Mo. App. 116, 103 S. W. 975.
"i'Cle eland Iron Co. v. Ennor, (1886) 116 Ill. 55, 4 N. E. 762.
Schaefer Ball Bearing Co., (1919) 90 N. J. Eq. 164, 106 Atl. 471;
Sarback v. Kansas Fiscal Agency Co., (1912) 86 Kan. 734, 122 Pac. 113.
"53Dalton Grocery Co. v. Blanton, (1911) 8 Ga. App. 807, 70
S. E. 183.
154 'his is the plan which the Illinois and New York statutes, supra
note 151 formulate.
"'A subsidiary organized for the purpose of carrying through these
employee-shareholder plans, if kept strictly to that activity, would
seem to offer a feasible solution of the problem. The Illinois and
New York statutes provide for it.
"
6ONew England Trust Co. v. Abbot, (1894) 162 Mass. 148, N. E.
27 L. R. A. 271; Lane v. Albertson, (1903) 78 App. Div. 607, 79
N. Y. S. 947; Casper v. Kalt-Zimmers Mfg Co., (1915) 159 Wis. 517,
150 N. W. 1101: Bargate v. Shortridge, (1855) 5 H. L. Cas. 297; F.
Herring v. Ruskin Co-op. Ass'n, (Tenn. Ch. App. 1899) 52 S. W. 327;
Ireland v. Glove Milling Co., (1895) 19 R. I. 180, 32 Atl. 921.
At any rate it is no more objectionable than a similar option in
the corporation to repurchase under the existing schemes. Blooming-
dale v. Bloomingdale, (1919) 107 Misc. Rep. 646, 177 N. Y. S. 873.
Further, in the case of a corporation a general promise to repur-
chase its employees' shares may be invalid because of some legal
restrictions on the funds which the company may devote to the pur-
chase. Williams v. Brownstein, (D.C. Me. 1924) 1 F. (2d) 470: Top-
ken, Loring & Schwartz, Inc. v. Schwartz, (1928) 249 N. Y. 206, 163
N. E. 735; Cf. Chapman v. Ironclad Rheostat Co., (1898) 62 N. J. L.
497, 41 Atl. 690. This would be true even in the case of preferred stock.
Koeppler v. Crocker Chair Co., (Wis. 1929) 228 N. W. 130. And of
course these restraints may invalidate the agreement made with the
employees. No such troubles would attend options in individual share-
holders to repurchase when the employee quit, or in a subsidiary organ-
ized for that purpose.
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If this suggested method for employee-shareholder plans is too
cumbersome, the purchase of its shares might be pernmitted by
statute for this purpose without conceding the power generally.
IN STOCK-SELLING ScHEMES
From a social standpoint, it is of questionable value to permit
corporations to sell their stock with the right in the vendee to
resell to the company if dissatisfied.'57 A share of stock is differ-
ent from an ordinary chattel, and a sale of stock with an option to
return it presents a different situation from a similar right attached
to the sale of common merchandise. Certainly creditors, if un-
aware of such reservations to the subscription, might protest
against the exercise of this option when the venture has become
a bad one, 5 " for the subscriber will then want his money back
and will seize upon the right to return the shares. The creditor
will be looking to the capital of the failing enterprise for the
satisfaction of his claim. To permit the shareholder to exercise
his power in such a case is to prefer him to a creditor, or at least
to corivert him into a treditor. 59 To call this practice a rescission
of a sale' 60 or- the failure of a conditional sale'8 ' may be a legal-
istic differentiation, but it does not alter the fact that the con-
ditional shareholder is being given a preference.
Furthermore, consider the position of other shareholders who
have subscribed with no such reservation. If they are unaware
at the time they subscribe of the conditions to the subscriptions of
others,' 6 2 the deceit is apparent. 63  For the difference between
entering a venture in which all the capital has been unconditionally
257See note 13 supra.
158Scovill v. Thayer, (1881) 105 U. S. 143, 26 L. Ed. 968; Upton
v. Tribleock, (1875) 91 U. S. 45, 23 L. Ed. 203; Melvin v. Lamar Ins.
Co., (1875) 80 Ill. 446, 22 Am. Rep. 199 (1875).
159Allen v. Commercial Nat'l Bank, (C.C.A. 6th cir. 1911) 191
Fed. 97.
iG°Vent v. Duluth Coffee & Spice Co., (1896) 64 Minn. 307, 67 N.
W. 70; See note, (1918) 2 MINNESorA LAW RFvIEw 458.
'10 Schulte v. Boulevard Garden Land Co., (1913) 164 Cal. 464,
129 Pac. 582. Williams v. Maryland Glass Co., (1919) 134 Md. 320,
106 AtI. 755.
1 2For it is hard to visualize the issue of all the stock of a cor-
poration with similar strings attached. If that were the case, all the
subscribers could return their stock and the corporation would fade
into nothingness. Such an issue would never be permitted for every
state requires a minimum of paid-in capital-e. Ohio Gen. Code
sec. 8637-37; Missouri, Rev. Stat. sec. 10152. THeg feature we are dis-
cussing will usually be found in subsequent stock issues.
163Sarbach v. Kansas Fiscal Agency, (1912) 86 Kans. 734, 122
Pac. 113, Ann. Cas. 1913C 415; Meyer v. Blair, et al., (1888) 109
N. Y. 600, 17 N. E. 228.
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contributed, and one in which there are some capricious subscrip-
tions is great.
The Supreme Court has questioned the desirability of these
stock-selling schemes and has cast doubt on their legality. 10 4
Certainly this end is no sufficient justification for granting the
broad power to corporations to create treasury stock.
FORFEITURE, SURRENDER, ETc.
Even in England where the prohibition against a corporation
purchasing its own shares is well settled, exceptions are recog-
nized.'10  Thus, it is appreciated that a company must have the
power to forfeit shares for non-payment of calls or assessments. 0 6
This is necessary to lend effective sanction to the organization's
legitimate needs for further contributions, and to enforce sub-
scribers' promises. No objection is apparent. Neither creditors
nor the remaining shareholders can be heard to complain, for
either additional capital will be realized when the subscriber yields
to the threat of forfeiture or else when the forfeited shares are
resold. And even if the shares forfeited remain in the treasury
forever or are retired, the obligations of the company are thereby
decreased and the other members' share in the assets is pro tanto
increased. And although treasury stock is thereby created, for-
feiture is no purchase of its own .shares, for it involves no outlay
of its company's assets. There can be no valid objection to this
necessary power.
Similarly a surrender of shares in a situation where otherwise
the corporation would resort to forfeiture creates treasury stock,
but is a harmless transaction. 167  But a surrender of shares to a
company which called for any monetary outlay by it is as objec-
tionable as, if it could be distinguished from, an outright pur-
1 4 Burke v. Smith, (1872) 16 Wall. (U.S.) 390, 21 L. Ed. 361.
'6 5 Trevor v. Whitworth, (1887) 12 A. C. 409.
'
0 It is to be noted that in some jurisdictions even the power to
forfeit shares for non-payment of calls is denied in the absence of a
statutory grant. Cartwright v. Dickinson, (1889) 88 Tenn. 476, 12
S. W. 1030; Budd v. Multnomah St. Ry. Co., (1887) 15 Or. 413, 15
Pac. 649; Vasey v. New Export Coal Co., (1921) 89 W. Va. 491,
109 S. E. 619. But even though a purchase be prohibited the right
to forfeit shares in such situations is generally conceded. Mitchell
v. Blue Star Mining Co., (1917) 98 Wash. 191, 167 Pac. 130; Lemoore
Canal & Irrigation Co. v. McKenna, (1912) 163 Cal. 736, 127 Pac.
345. Sometimes it is provided that such shares must be sold at public
sale and only in the absence of other bidders may the defaulting shares
be purchased by the company. Idaho, Comp. Stat. 1919, sec. 4745; Cal.
Civil Code 1915, sec. 343.
lo T]1ellerby v. Rowland, r19021 2 Ch. 14, 71 L. J. Ch. Div. 541;
Crandall v. Lincoln, (1884) 52 Conn. 73, 52, Am. Rep. 560; State v.
Oberlin Building Ass'n, (1879) 35 Ohio St. 258.
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chase.i 6s  Likewise, if a surrender were accepted in a situation
where the shares were not fully paid up and the balance due was
collectible, creditors and shareholders alike could object that this
was in effect a modified purchase, and that the cancellation of an
enforcible claim against the subscriber was parting with valuable
corporate assets. 69
Gifts or bequests of its fully paid shares to a corporation would
seem to be unobjectionable and are generally allowed. 70 And
where by operation of law, treasury stock is created, 1 7' of course




6sBellerby v. Rowland, [19021 2 Ch. 14, 71 L. J. Ch. Div. 541.
It has been held a fraud on creditors for a corporation to pur-
chase its shares in an attempt to discharge the liability of an original
subscriber for unpaid subscriptions by the use of the corporate assets.
Hall v. Alabama Terminal, etc., Co., (1911) 173 Ala. 398, 56 So. 235.
'
69Sawyer v. Hoag, (1873) 17 Wall. (U.S.) 610, 21 L. E. 731; Payne
v. Brillard, (1851) 23 Miss. 88, 55 Am. Dec. 74; Harmon v. Hunt,(1895) 116 N. C. 678, 21 S. E. 559; Nichols v. Stevens, (1894) 123
Mo. 96, 25 S. W. 578; Bellerby v. Rowland, [1902] 2 Ch. 14, 71 L. 3.
Ch. 541.
It has been held that a release of unpaid subscriptions is valid
against subsequent creditors. Shoemaker v. Washburn Lumber Co.,(1897) 97 Wis. 585, 73 N. W. 333. But the relation between creditors
and shareholders in Wisconsin is unusual, and the rights of the former
with respect to the capital fund are peculiarly meagre there. See
Atlanta & Walworth B. & C. Ass'n v. Smith, (1910) 141 Wis. 377,
381, 123 N. W. 106.
'17 -Rivanna Nay. Co. v. Dawsons, (1846) 3 Gratt. (Va.) 19, 46 Am.
Dec. 183.
171Condouris v. Imp. Turkish Tob. Co., (1893) 3 Misc. Rep. 66,
22 N. Y. S. 695.
172The redemption of preferred stock, though analogous to a
purchase of the company's own shares, is, strictly speaking, a species
of authorized reduction of capital. Ohio, Gen. Code, sec. 8623-39.
Since provision is made as to the details of redemption either in the
statutes, Maryland, Ann. Code, Bagby, sec. 50, or in the articles,
creditors have notice, and if the statutory mode is followed they can-
not complain. Westerfield-Bonte Co. v. Burnett, (1917) 176 Ky. 188,
195, S. W. 477; Mannington v. Hocking Valley Ry. Co., (C.C. Ohio
1910) 183 Fed. 133.
Since preferred stock seldom has a say in the policies of the com-
pany, shareholders are not injured by this form of corporate trans-
acti6n. Berger v. U. S. Steel Co., (1902) 63 N. J. Eq. 809, 53 Atl. 68;
Hackett v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., (1901) 36 Misc. Rep. 583. 73 N.
Y. S. 1087. Especially since it is being realized today that in many
ways preferred stock is coming to resemble bonds and notes, and
their redemption is analogous to the payment of corporate debts. Berle,
Materials of -Corporation Finance 529: See Stone v. U. S. Envelope Co.,
(1920) 119 Me. 394, 111 Atl. 536; (1927) 27 Col. L. R. 587.
But the right of preferred shareholders to have their shares re-
deemed is subservient to the rights of creditors. Booth v. Union
Fibre Co.. (1919) 142 Minn. 127, 171 N. W. 307. Ellsworth v. Lyons,(C.C.A. 6th cir. 1910) 181 Fed. 55. Culver v. Reno Real Estate Co.,(1879) 91 Pa. St. 367; Spencer v. Smith, (C.C.A. 8th cir. 1912) 201
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Another situation in which it is justifiable for a corporation
to become the owner of its own shares is in the settlement of an
otherwise uncollectible debt from one of its shareholder.. The
justification is the necessity of saving loss.'7 3 Likewise in com-
promising a claim of the corporation against one of its members,
the merits of which are in dispute, the directors should be per-
mitted to accept shares. 1 74 Here, too, the device would be resorted
to in order to save the corporation money and troubleY.
7
Of course, the limitation on the exercise of the power in these
cases is that the directors use honest and reasonable judgment
that the debt is otherwise uncollectible or that the disputed claim
merits this sort of compromise.
In those states where provision is made for buying out dis-
senters in the event of certain radical corporate changes,'17 such as
mergers or consolidations, the purchase of its shares either for
retirement or resale would have to be allowed. This right to
payment will have to be restricted, however, so that the necessary
protection to which creditors are entitled will not be jeopardized.,7,
Thus, in those states where this possible conflict is perceived it is
provided that dissenters shall be paid only if sufficient surplus
funds are available, or if enough assets would remain to satisfy
Fed. 647. Thus a provision in a stock certificate by which the corpora-
tion binds itself to redeem the preferred stock at a fixed date confers
no absolute right to redemption on the holder and will be enforced
only if the rights of creditors are not prejudiced thereby. Koeppler
v. Crocker Chair Co., (Wis. 1929) 228 N. IV. 130. Warren v. Queen
& Co., (1913) 240 Pa. 154, 87 At. 595. Quaere whether such a promise
gives rise to any contract at all. Topken, Loring & Schwartz Co. v.
Schwartz, (1928) 249 N. Y. 206, 163 N. E. 735.
173Coppin v. Greenless & Ransom Co., (1882) 38 Oh. St. 275, 279,
43 Am. Rep. 425; Draper v. Blackwell, (1882) 138 Ala. 182, 35 So.
110; Crandall v. Lincoln, (1884) 52 Conn. 73, 100, 52 Am. Rep. 560.
'74State v. Oberlin Building Ass'n, (1879) 35 Oh. St. 258.
175 t is probably desirable that the corporation have the power
to eliminate fractional shares by purchase. The Ohio Corporation
Act was amended in 1929 to provide for this. Ohio Code, sec. 8623-41.
17See for example, Massachusetts, Gen. Laws ch. 156, sec. 46; New
York Stock Corp. Law, secs. 21, 87, 38, 14, 105; Kentucky, Ann. Stat.
(Carrol) sec. 558.
177Thus payment to dissenters should not be permitted if it would
render the company insolvent, or make it otherwise unable to meet
its obligations. And where the statutes or decisions permit purchases
of its own stock only out of the corporation's surplus, this limitation
will most probably have to be carried over to restrict this remedy
of dissenters. An alternative solution is to decide that since there
are not enough surplus funds to care for dissenters, the corporation
cannot go ahead with the change which brings about the need for
buying out dissenters. See Levy, Rights of Dissenters to Appraisal
and Payment, (1930) 15 Corn. L. J. 420.
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the corporation's obligations. 7 8 This conflict of interests is a large
problem involving the reconciliation of the right of creditors,
majority shareholders and investors.
CONCLUSIONS
The problem seems to the writer to be essentially this. Should
the state concede to corporations this power to purchase their
shares generally and leave it to courts of equity to restrain its
abuse? Or should the power be denied because it is theoretically
unsound and practically capable of wide and flagrant misuse; and
further because the useful functions it serves can be performed
by other well-recognized corporate devices? It will have been
gathered that the writer leans strongly to the latter view. The
history of corporate practices in our "liberal incorporation states"
should show us the dangers attending the grant of wide powers
and the inadequacy of the equity actions to keep them within
proper bounds.
And the problem must be met. Too much of the nation's
wealth is tied up in the shares of corporations' and in the debts
they "owe to permit us to deal lightly with the situation. To leave
the matter in the discretionary powers of a court of equity for
solution is not enough. At best it provides an injured shareholder
witfi a weak weapon in a struggle where the odds are against him.
The suit is slow and costly, and the full records are not easily
accessible. Moreover, our courts have displayed a reluctance to
interfere in business management or to disturb the effect of the
contractual agreements involved in corporate relations.8 0 The
problem calls for statutory regulation. And this has been appre-
ciated in a great many states, although the regulation has seldom
been sufficiently comprehensive. But though the problem seems
to have been appreciated in many states, it seems to the writer that
.
78Ohio, Code sec. 8623-41; Maryland, Ann. Code (Bagby) sec. 50;
Tennessee, Gen. Corp. Act sec. 38, Tennessee, Public Acts 1929, p. 261.
The Uniform Business Corporation Act has likewise reached the de-
cision that the rights of dissenters must yield to the superior rights
of creditors, sec. 42-3.
'
79The estimated wealth of the United States has been set atbetween 350 and 500 billion dollars; its industrial wealth at between
150 and 250 billion dollars; The estimated net assets of all corpora-
tions at 140-150 billion dollars and the gross assets of 200 "largest
corporations" (1927) at $68,450,000,000. The figures are from Berle,
Materials in the Law of Corporation Finance 171, based on Moody's
Manuals for 1928.
180See the dissenting opinion of Learned Hand, J., in Barclay
v. Wabash Ry. Co., (C.C.A. 2nd cir. 1929) 30 F. (2d) 260 which was
adopted by the Supreme Court in (1930) 280 U. S. 197, 50 Sup. Ct. 106.
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the solution has been faulty. That the denial of the power to
purchase its own shares entails no great hardships in financing
corporations, and prevents numerous undesirable corporate prac-
tices, this paper has sought to show; also that such a rule would
make of our corporation law a more consistent science. That its
practice would be productive of no dire consequences, the history
of corporations in England in the last half century is ample
testimony.18 '
lslSince this paper was first written, the board of governors of
the New York Stock Exchange have acted and prohibited investment
companies which are listed on its board from purchasing their own
shares either directly or through subsidiaries. See the New York
Times for May 27, "1930. These corporations are reported to have
engaged in the practice of trading in their own shares on an extensive
scale. During the market break in the fall of 1929, these purchases
at high prices resulted in large losses when the shares subsequently
receded in value. Because of the complicated and pyramided financial
structure of most of the large investment "trusts," it is difficult to
learn with any definiteness the extent and results of these activities;
but the action of the Exchange indicates that the practice must have
been widespread and the consequences bad.
The ruling of the Exchange does make allowances for "exceptional
circumstances" when purchases will be permitted under surveillance of
the governors. What these circumstances are is not specified in the
formal ruling, but it is believed that they cover those situations where
a company must accept its own shares to save loss-e. g. for ante-
cedent debts otherwise uncollectible or to enforce calls. These are
the usual exceptions made in those jurisdictions where purchases are
generally prohibited.
It is difficult to understand why the Exchange has limited its
ruling to investment corporations. The purchase of its shares by a
corporation whose main activity is manufacture or transportation or
what not has the same consequences as the acquisition of treasury
stock by a company which is in the business to buy, hold and sell
the stock of other corporations. If the Exchange appreciates that
the dangers attending the trafficking in their own shares by corpora-
tions call for a prohibition, it should make it cover all corporations.
The London Stock Exchange has done this. To do otherwise is to
provide a half-way remedy based on an arbitrary classification.
